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Abstract 
A fair amount of scholarship
1
 and popular writing
2
 has been devoted to the impact 
great thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment had on the American Revolution and 
Declaration of Independence.  The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Scottish 
Enlightenment influenced the drafting of the United States Constitution and the 
establishment of a constitutional republic.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Scottish Enlightenment and introduces the key 
Scottish thinkers whose Enlightenment ideas appear to have influenced the American 
philosophical debates during the late eighteenth century. Chapter 2 is an examination of 
that influence upon colonial Americans. Chapter 3 explores the philosophical debates from 
the Declaration of Independence through the drafting of the Constitution. Chapter 4 takes 
the debate from the Framers who drafted the proposed Constitution to the Founders who 
ratified the Constitution through a state convention process. Chapter 5 examines the 
continued influence of the Scottish Enlightenment during the early days of the 
constitutional republic.  
A final chapter of concluding remarks offers the thesis that, while it is unrealistic to 
conclude that the Enlightenment influence in American political thought in general or upon 
the United States Constitution in particular was uniquely Scottish, neither should the 
distinctively Scottish contributions to the shaping of the constitutional republic be ignored 
in the historical record as had been the case during most of the nineteenth century. As was 
true of the development of competing Enlightenment ideas in Scotland, the private 
deliberations at the Constitutional Convention, the public pamphlet campaign waged by 
Federalists who supported the proposed Constitution and Anti-Federalists who opposed it, 
and the successive decisions by state ratifying conventions to adopt the Constitution were 
all characterized by vigorous debates about reason and passion, virtue and ambition, and 
authority and liberty.  Ultimately, it would be the courageous spirit of reasoned public 
discourse, as much as the developing themes of liberty, that the Scottish Enlightenment 
would contribute to the constitutional debates in the emerging United States. 
                                                 
1
 See e.g., Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday & Company, 1978). 
2
 See e.g., Arthur Herman, How the Scots Invented the Modern World (New York: Crown Publishers, 
2001). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Scottish Enlightenment 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Scottish Enlightenment influenced 
the drafting of the proposed Constitution, the ratification of the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, and the establishment of a constitutional republic in the United States of America.  
This introductory chapter is meant to place the Scottish Enlightenment in context, 
both within the broader movement known as the Enlightenment and with respect to the 
historical setting of eighteenth-century Scotland, as well as to provide an overview of the 
themes of the Scottish Enlightenment that will become the focus of this inquiry regarding 
the intellectual origins of the United States Constitution. The Scottish thinkers and the 
Enlightenment ideas chosen for discussion in this introduction have been selected on the 
basis of their particular contribution to the philosophical debates accompanying the 
drafting of the proposed Constitution, the ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
and the establishment of a constitutional republic in the United States.   
Christopher Berry describes the Enlightenment as a self-conscious movement in 
which the intellectuals of the eighteenth century saw themselves as living in and promoting 
a “century of lights.”1 Berry cites Immanuel Kant’s essay, “What is Enlightenment?” for 
the most succinct answer to Kant’s own question: The Enlightenment is Sapere Aude!—
“dare to know!”2 Kant paraphrased his motto of the Enlightenment as “Have courage to 
use your own reason.”3 The essence of the Enlightenment cannot be circumscribed by a 
particular set of substantive ideas—instead, the Enlightenment represents the rejection of 
the traditional appeal to authority in favor of an appeal to reason for the answers to 
whatever subject happens to be the topic of debate.
4
 
Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment 
Alexander Broadie identifies three historical events that presumably should have 
hindered Scotland’s cultural development: (1) the unification of the crowns of Scotland 
                                                 
1
 Christopher Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1997), 1-2. 
2
 Ibid., 2. 
3
 Alexander Broadie, ed., The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 
1997), 1. 
4
 Kenneth R. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy (Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 
2008), 22. 
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and England in 1603; (2) the disastrous Darien Scheme to establish a colony in Central 
America, with the attendant adverse economic consequences in Scotland; and (3) the 
abolition of Scotland’s parliament in 1707.5 Notwithstanding these political and economic 
events, the prominence of the university in most of Scotland’s major cities provided 
uncommon educational opportunities in philosophy, theology, law, medicine, mathematics, 
and science.
6
 The intellectual liveliness of the Scottish universities cultivated an 
environment in which enlightened thinkers, often referred to as the “literati,” were reacting 
to, and at times in defiance of, the oppressive political and economic conditions of 
seventeenth-century Scotland.
7
 
Berry contends that the pamphlet war that was waged at the time of the Act of Union 
of 1707 was a significant factor in shaping the character of the Enlightenment, presumably 
in Scotland, but perhaps beyond.
8
 Certainly, the very notion of a “pamphlet war” would be 
revisited in the American colonies later in the eighteenth century. 
As Broadie points out, many of the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment were not 
merely contemporaries, but friends, arguing with one another and forming various 
philosophical societies.
9
 Thomas Reid, for example, was a founder of the Aberdeen 
Philosophical Society, known as the “Wise Club.”10 The Wise Club often debated the 
moral philosophy of David Hume,
11
 who championed the idea that “as the science of man 
is the only foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give this 
science itself must be laid on experience and observation.”12 Hume lamented the 
“separation of the learned from the conversational world,” noting that it “seems to have 
been the great defect of the last age.”13 Hume considered himself to be an “ambassador 
from the dominions of learning to those of conversation.”14 Other philosophical and 
literary societies established during the Age of Enlightenment included the Royal Society 
                                                 
5
 Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 10. 
6
 Ibid., 11. 
7
 Ibid., 13-14. 
8
 Berry, Social Theory, 9. 
9
 Alexander Broadie, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 
10
 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), 
xx. 
11
 Alexander Broadie, “Reid in Context,” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, eds. Terence 
Cuneo and René van Woudenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33. 
12
 Hume, Human Nature, xx. 
13
 David Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” in Selected Essays, eds. Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1. 
14
 Ibid., 2. 
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of Edinburgh, the Literary Society in Glasgow, the Select Society in Edinburgh, and the 
Society of the Antiquaries of Scotland.
15
 
These Enlightenment thinkers, however, did not limit their discourse to intellectual 
debate within the academy. According to R. H. Campbell, the writers of the Enlightenment 
recognized the links between intellectual and economic development, though Campbell 
himself argues that the Enlightenment did not initiate a trend toward economic 
improvement, but, rather, that “attempts to lead Scotland to new forms of economic 
enterprise were perhaps among the origins of the Enlightenment itself.”16 Although T.M. 
Devine concludes that the Scottish merchant community, between 1680 and 1740, made 
little intellectual contribution to the early Enlightenment, he does suggest that they 
indirectly helped “to provide, with the professional and landed classes, a social and 
material environment which was not resistant to change.”17 A notable example of the 
active exchange of ideas between the literati and the business community, at least in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century, was Adam Smith’s practice of previewing his theories 
of free trade before, and receiving valuable feedback from, the prosperous merchants of 
Glasgow at such society meetings.
18
 Moreover, Berry points to the “Honourable Society of 
Improvers,” organized with the practical aim of reforming agricultural practices, but which 
also contributed to the development of the linen industry, as evidence that the literati were 
directly involved in economic improvement in eighteenth-century Scotland.
19
  
Contributions to Political Discourse 
Although the Enlightenment was equally influential among Scottish scientists, artists, 
and religious thinkers, it is the Enlightenment’s impact upon moral philosophy and law that 
takes center stage in an examination of the Scottish Enlightenment’s influence upon the 
emerging ideological and political landscape in the American colonies.   
Knud Haakonssen contends that, “[i]n the mainstream of natural jurisprudence in the 
eighteenth century, natural rights derived from natural law and natural duty.”20 Haakonssen 
                                                 
15
 Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 16-17. 
16
 R. H. Campbell, “The Enlightenment and the Economy,” in The Origins and Nature of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, eds. R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edingburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1982), 8, 
23.  
17
 T. M. Devine, “The Scottish Merchant Community: 1680 - 1740,” in Origins and Nature of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, eds. Campbell and Skinner, 37. 
18
 Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 17. 
19
 Berry, Social Theory, 11-12. 
20
 Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 311. 
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further notes that natural law was a prevalent academic form of moral philosophy in the 
eighteenth century.
21
 And according to Haakonssen, this popular moral philosophy based 
on natural law was not a hindrance to republican politics.
22
 “A cornerstone in the natural 
law theory . . . is the proposition that the law of nature prescribes duties and grants 
matching rights that, when properly taken care of, contribute to the general common good 
or greatest happiness in God’s creation.”23 
In his essay on “Law and Enlightenment,” Neil MacCormick, not wishing to 
narrowly define the period of the Enlightenment, looks to seventeenth century Scots legal 
writing as a philosophical backdrop.
24
 MacCormick defines a “natural lawyer” as a 
“believer in the thesis that there is a natural order of principles regulating every rational 
being, this order being twice over grounded in reason – first, in that what is right is 
rationally related to the nature of the being in question, second, in that his reason is what 
makes a rational being aware of these principles of right conduct.”25 Indeed, James 
Dalrymple, 1st Viscount Stair, who first published his Institutions of the Law of Scotland in 
1681 (the foundation of modern Scots law), defined law as “the dictate of reason, 
determining every rational being to that which is congruous and convenient for the nature 
and condition thereof.”26 MacCormick points to Stair as a “natural lawyer” par 
excellence.
27
 Although Broadie places Stair in the pre-Enlightenment period, Broadie 
himself contends that Stair’s Institutions, “more than any other text . . . formed the basis 
for Scottish discussions on law during the century of the Enlightenment.”28  
MacCormick argues that one of the central questions in the Scottish moral 
philosophy of the eighteenth century is whether “reason” reveals or contains principles of 
right conduct.
29
 Stair, who, according to MacCormick, adopted his doctrine from Hugo 
Grotius, concluded that reason does reveal principles of right conduct.
30
 Francis 
Hutcheson, on the other hand, was critical of this view, arguing that reason “is understood 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 312. 
22
 Ibid., 327. 
23
 Ibid., 332. 
24
 Neil MacCormick, “Law and Enlightenment,” in Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
eds. Campbell and Skinner, 150-51. 
25
 Ibid., 152. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 11. 
29
 MacCormick, “Law and Enlightenment,” 155. 
30
 Ibid. 
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to denote our Power of finding out true Propositions.”31 In Hutcheson’s view, moral 
distinctions were discovered, not by reason, but by a moral sense.
32
 
Moral Sense Theory 
Francis Hutcheson
33
 is generally acknowledged to be the “father” of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.
34
 Hutcheson’s moral sense theory was summed up by his contention that 
the best action to take is that “which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest 
Numbers.”35 Furthermore, Hutcheson, rejecting Thomas Hobbes’ claim that all human 
action is self-interested,
36
 argued that “all Men have Self-Love as well as Benevolence,” 
which by definition requires such a man to be capable of a “desire of, or delight in, the 
Good of others.”37 Hutcheson defined moral goodness as “our Idea of some Quality 
apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation and Love toward the Actor, from 
those who receive no Advantage from the Action.”38 Berry points to the following 
example: suppose we benefit equally from two men; the first does so “from delight in our 
happiness,” the second from “views of self-interest or by constraint.”39 Although the 
benefit is the same, Hutcheson declared that we have “quite different Sentiments of 
them.”40 That difference is perceived by the moral sense.41 The principle of self-interest, 
according to Hutcheson, is insufficient to explain the reality of morality.
42
 
According to T.D. Campbell, Hutcheson’s intellectual objective was to demonstrate 
“the benevolent intentions of the ‘Author of nature’ in the functional inter-relationships of 
the constituent elements of human society.”43 As Wolfgang Leidhold points out, however, 
                                                 
31
 Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Aaron Garrett (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 137. 
32
 Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy, 143. 
33
 Francis Hutcheson was born in Drumalig, Ireland, in 1694, graduated from the University of 
Glasgow in 1712, became the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1729, and died in 
1746.  Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 799-800. 
34
 T. D. Campbell, “Francis Hutcheson: ‘Father’ of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in Origins and 
Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, eds. Campbell and Skinner, 167. 
35
 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two 
Treatises, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), 125. 
36
 Campbell, “Francis Hutcheson,” 168. 
37
 Hutcheson, Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 103-04. 
38
 Ibid., 85. 
39
 Berry, Social Theory, 158. 
40
 Hutcheson, Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 90. 
41
 Berry, Social Theory, 158. 
42
 Ibid., 159. 
43
 Campbell, “Francis Hutcheson,” 167. 
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phrases used by Hutcheson, like “publick Good,” revealed a political perspective in his 
moral philosophy:
44
 
Should any one ask even concerning these two ultimate Ends, private 
Good and publick, is not the latter more reasonable than the former?—What 
means the Word reasonable in this Question? . . . If the meaning of the 
Question be this, “does not every Spectator approve the Pursuit of publick 
Good more than private?” The Answer is obvious that he does: but not for any 
Reason or Truth, but from a moral Sense.
45
 
According to Hutcheson, our “Ideas of Rights” derived from this moral Sense.46 
Hutcheson classified two primary categories of rights, as either perfect—those rights which 
“are of such necessity to the publick Good, that the universal Violation of them would 
make human Life intolerable”; or imperfect—those rights which, “when universally 
violated, would not necessarily make Men miserable.”47 Hutcheson enumerated as 
instances of perfect rights: “those to our Lives; to the Fruits of our Labours; to demand 
Performance of Contracts upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing 
them; to direct our own Actions either for publick, or innocent private Good, before we 
have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure; and many others of like 
nature.”48 “Instances of imperfect Rights are those which the poor have to the Charity of 
the Wealthy; which all Men have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the Performer; 
which Benefactors have to returns of Gratitude, and such like.”49 In addition, Hutcheson 
identified a third category of External rights—those which, though they be “really 
detrimental to the Publick” are such that “universally denying Men this Faculty of doing, 
possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of it, would do more 
mischief than all the Evils to be fear’d from the Use of this Faculty.”50 
Of government, Hutcheson concluded “[t]hat all human Power, or Authority, must 
consist in a Right transferr’d to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of 
others; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an 
external Right to do or command everything.”51 Because there can be “no Right, or 
Limitation of Right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good,” 
Hutcheson recognized that, when a “Necessity to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may 
                                                 
44
 Wolfgang Leidhold, “Introduction to Hutcheson,” Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, xvii. 
45
 Hutcheson, Illustrations on the Moral Sense, 144. 
46
 Hutcheson, Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 183. 
47
 Ibid., 183-84. 
48
 Ibid., 184. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid., 185. 
51
 Ibid., 192. 
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justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg’d in their Governours, or may counteract them.”52 
As Hutcheson stated, “No Person, or State can be happy, where they do not think their 
important Rights are secur’d from the Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice of their 
Governours.”53 
MacCormick distinguishes the strict “moral sense” man in Hutcheson, from his 
successors, David Hume and Adam Smith, who have been described as “sentimentalists.”54 
Sentimentalists 
David Hume,
55
 whom Broadie characterizes as the “greatest philosopher of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, and perhaps its central figure,”56 advanced a moral philosophy that 
emphasized utility—all acts that are morally praiseworthy are considered useful as 
“conducive to the happiness of mankind.”57  
According to Hume, to say that moral distinctions may be “discernible by pure 
reason” was a specious argument.58 Although truth is disputable, taste is not: “what exists 
in the nature of things is the standard of our judgment; what each man feels within himself 
is the standard of sentiment.”59 In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume 
acknowledged a contemporaneous controversy “concerning the general foundation of 
Morals,” which he posed as follows:  
whether they be derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain 
the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an 
immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of 
truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; 
or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded 
entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species.
60
 
                                                 
52
 Ibid., 194-95. 
53
 Ibid., 195. 
54
 MacCormick, “Law and Enlightenment,” 158. 
55
 David Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711, attended the University of Edinburgh, served as 
librarian of the Advocates’ Library in Edinburgh, and died in 1776.  Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 799. 
56
 Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 799. 
57
 Ibid., 144. 
58
 David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,” in Enquiries Concerning the 
Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 2nd ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1902), 171. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid., 170. 
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Hume pointed out that John Locke’s notion of the tacit consent of the governed was 
implausible.
61
 Hume acknowledged the premise that: “The people, if we trace government 
to its first origins in the woods and deserts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and 
voluntarily, for the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received 
laws from their equal and companion.”62 Nevertheless, Hume argued that any original 
consent was “very imperfect”—speculating that a chieftain “who had probably acquired 
his influence during the continuance of war, ruled more by persuasion than command; and 
till he could employ force to reduce the refractory and disobedient, the society could 
scarcely be said to have attained a state of civil government.”63 The idea, Hume said, of an 
agreement expressly formed for general submission was “an idea far beyond the 
comprehension of savages.”64 According to Hume, even if there had been some contract in 
the past, it could not bind any but the original contractors.
65
 Furthermore, Hume contended 
that [a]lmost all the governments which exist at present, or of which there remains any 
record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, 
without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people.”66  
Hume stated that we are “to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as 
having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice . . . .”67 Indeed, 
the subjects of government are motivated to give their allegiance by their perception of the 
public interest in protection, especially in the administration of justice, an interest which, 
over time, creates a “moral obligation of honour and conscience.”68 Even so, Hume 
described justice as an artificial virtue—that is, one “which arises from the circumstances 
and necessity of mankind.”69 According to MacCormick, Hume’s conclusion that justice is 
an artificial virtue led him to the argument that the value of justice is solely in the general 
utility of those rules which determine men’s rights, especially proprietary rights.70 As 
Hume said, “public utility is the sole origin of justice.”71 Ultimately, for Hume, the object 
                                                 
61
 Berry, Social Theory, 32. 
62
 David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in Selected Essays, eds. Copley and Edgar, 276. 
63
 Ibid., 277. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Knud Haakonssen, “The Structure of Hume’s Political Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hume, 2nd ed., eds. David Fate Norton and Jacqueline Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 353. 
66
 Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” 279. 
67
 David Hume, “Of the Origin of Government,” in Selected Essays, eds. Copley and Edgar, 28. 
68
 Haakonssen, “The Structure of Hume’s Political Theory,” 354. 
69
 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 477. 
70
 MacCormick, “Law and Enlightenment,” 158. 
71
 Hume, “Principles of Morals,” 183. 
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of justice was not equality of possessions but personal liberty—a liberty that is best 
safeguarded by the administration of justice that protects property and contracts.
72
  
According to Hume, liberty “is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, 
where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of 
approbation or dislike.”73 Hume began with a basic definition of liberty as: “a power of 
acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to 
remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.”74 
For Hume, “the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and 
condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that utility, which 
results to the public from their strict and regular observance.”75 Thus, Hume doubted what 
he called the fiction of a state of nature, a concept, which, he noted, did not originate with 
Hobbes, but which could be traced back at least as far as Cicero.
76
 
Hume acknowledged that both history and common sense inform us that ideas of 
perfect equality are impracticable and would be pernicious to human nature.
77
 Instead, 
justice requires laws for the regulation of property; rules, which on the whole, are most 
useful and beneficial to society.
78
 For Hume, it was necessary to regulate, not only the 
actions of the governed, but that of the governors as well—“a republican and free 
government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided 
by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, 
to act for the public good.”79 
As a student at the University of Glasgow, Adam Smith
80
 was significantly 
influenced by Hutcheson.
81
 Later, while lecturing in Edinburgh, Smith developed a 
                                                 
72
 Ibid., 194-95. 
73
 David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” in Enquiries Concerning the 
Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 99. 
74
 Ibid., 95. 
75
 Hume, “Principles of Morals,” 188. 
76
 Ibid., 189. 
77
 Ibid., 194. 
78
 Ibid., 194-95. 
79
 David Hume, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,” in Selected Essays, eds. Copley and 
Edgar, 14. 
80
 Adam Smith was born in 1723 in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, attended the University of Glasgow, and then 
Balliol College, Oxford, returned to Glasgow where he was appointed to the chair of logic and rhetoric in 
1751 and to the moral philosophy chair in 1752, and died in 1790.  Broadie, Scottish Enlightenment, 804. 
81
 Knud Haakonssen, “Introduction: The Coherence of Smith’s Thought,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1. 
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significant friendship with Hume.
82
 Like Hume, Smith viewed moral philosophy as the key 
to a scientific study of human nature.
83
 Also, like Hume, Smith emphasized the importance 
of imagination, and its creative capacity, in human life and cognition.
84
 According to 
Charles Griswold, “Smith presents the imagination as lying at the heart of both ‘sympathy’ 
and of intellectual endeavor.”85 
Smith developed his doctrine of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
86
 
According to Broadie, Smith’s doctrine of sympathy is rooted in the concept of impartial 
spectator, seeds of which were present in Hutcheson’s moral philosophy, and well-
established in Hume’s writings.87 Smith’s doctrine of sympathy may be summarized as 
follows: “That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve 
reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of 
resentment, appears to deserve punishment.”88 According to Smith, gratitude and 
resentment “are the sentiments which most immediately and directly prompt to reward and 
to punish.”89 Smith further concluded that only actions of a beneficent tendency, which 
proceed from proper motives, require reward because they alone excite the sympathetic 
gratitude of the spectator.
90
 “Beneficence,” Smith said, “is always free, it cannot be 
extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment, because the mere want of 
beneficence tends to do no real positive evil.”91 Smith also recognized another virtue—
justice—which may be extorted by force, and the violation of which exposes one to 
resentment and punishment.
92
 
Smith was critical of Hume’s view that the idea of justice arises solely from utility.93 
According to Smith, “Man, it has been said, has a natural love for society, and desires that 
the union of mankind should be preserved for its own sake, and though he himself was to 
derive no benefit from it.”94 
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For Smith, the “four great objects of law are Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms.”95 
According to Smith, the end of Justice is to secure a man from injury: (1) as a man (“in his 
body, reputation, or estate”); (2) as a member of a family (“as a father, as a son, as a 
husband or wife, as a master or servant, as a guardian or pupil”); and (3) as a member of a 
state (“a magistrate may be injured by disobedience or a subject by oppression”).96 Smith 
said that rights that a man has to the preservation of his body and reputation from injury 
are called natural rights, whereas rights to his estate, both real and personal, are called 
acquired rights.
97
 According to Smith, the “objects of Police are the cheapness of 
commodities, public security, and cleanliness.”98 Revenue is “necessary that the magistrate 
who bestows his time and labour in the business of the state should be compensated.”99 
Finally, Arms are necessary so that “the government can defend themselves from foreign 
injuries and attacks.”100  
In The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith prioritized the duties of 
the sovereign, placing as the first duty of the sovereign “that of protecting the society from 
the violence and invasion of other independent societies.”101 The second duty of the 
sovereign, Smith said, was “that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society 
from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it.”102 According to Smith, 
“[t]he third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and 
maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, which . . . it . . . cannot be 
expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain.”103 
Regarding public jurisprudence, Smith said that there are two principles that induce 
men to enter into a civil society: authority and utility.
104
 While both of these principles are 
present in all governments, Smith contended that “in a monarchy the principle of authority 
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prevails, and in a democracey [sic] that of utility.”105 Smith rejected both the idea of a state 
of nature and the proposition that government owes its origins to a voluntary contract.
106
 
In explaining the nature of government, Smith reduced the forms of government to 
various blends of the following three: Monarchical, Aristocratical, and Democratical.
107
 As 
Smith noted, a monarchical government vests the supreme power and authority in one; an 
aristocratical government vests in a certain order of people the power to choose 
magistrates, who manage the state; and a democratical government “is where the 
management of affaires belongs to the whole body of the people together.”108 Smith 
concluded that because the last two forms may be called republican, “then the division of 
government is into monarchical and republican.”109 
Having divided acquired rights into real and personal, Smith defined real rights as 
property, servitude, pledge, and exclusive privilege.
110
 The principal real right is that of 
property, which Smith described as follows: 
Property is acquired five ways. 1st, by occupation, or the taking 
possession of what formerly belonged to no body. 2
d
, by accession, when a 
man has a right to one thing in consequence of another, as of a horse’s shoes 
along with the horse. 3
d
, by prescription, which is a right to a thing belonging 
to another arising from long and uninterrupted possession. 4, by succession to 
our ancestors or any other person, whither by a will or without one. 5
th
, by 
voluntary transference, when one delivers over his right to another.
111
 
Smith further noted that the laws of occupation vary “according to the periods of 
human society.”112 Smith identified “four distinct states” or “ages” of society: hunting, 
pasturage, farming, and commerce.
113
 According to Smith, “among hunters, there is no 
regular government; they live according to the laws of nature.”114 Smith presumed that 
hunters had no need for government because a hunter had little private property in need of 
protection: “Among savages property begins and ends with possession, and they seem 
scarce to have any idea of any thing as their own which is not about their own bodies.”115 
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Among hunters, Smith also said, “every man is a warrior as well as a hunter.”116 In the 
second stage—that of shepherds—“appropriation of herds and flocks, which introduced an 
inequality of fortune, was that which first gave rise to regular government.”117 As Ernest 
Metzger notes, “it is property that prompts the creation of government by making 
government necessary” in the age of shepherds.118 But it is the agriculture stage that gave 
rise to property’s “greatest extension” because, for the first time, it became necessary for 
the farmer to claim a right to cultivate a plot of land.
119
  Finally, the age of commerce 
naturally succeeds that of agriculture when man confines himself to one “species of 
labour” and begins to “naturaly exchange the surplus of their own commodity for that of 
another of which they stood in need.”120 In a commercial society, everyone is a 
“merchant”—that is to say, engaged in commerce.121  
In light of the prominence of Smith’s four stages theory, Haakonssen concludes that 
Smith’s spectator theory made morality as a whole an historical phenomenon, which was 
developed in depth by Smith’s greatest pupil, John Millar.122 Millar observed that there 
was, in human society, “a natural progress from ignorance to knowledge, and from rude to 
civilized manners, the several stages of which are usually accompanied with peculiar laws 
and customs.”123 For Millar, who provided extensive historical examples,124 the 
advancement of societies through the four stages was accompanied, not only by the 
development of property rights, but also the recognition of authority (by, for example, a 
chief over the members of a tribe and a sovereign over a state).
125
 According to Adam 
Tomkins, “[t]he core of Millar’s concern in the Origin was to show how the relations 
between authority, dependence and liberty are rooted in material practices and, in 
particular, the satisfaction and production of needs and desires.”126 Tomkins further notes 
that in the Historical View, Millar identifies “one of the greatest challenges posed for 
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republicanism in the Age of Commerce: how to construct and sustain a politics of the 
common good that does not immediately collapse into a politics of interest group 
pluralism.”127 This challenge, of course, would likewise be one of the key challenges 
facing the Founders of the new American republic. 
Civil Society 
Adam Ferguson
128
 also challenged the assumption that there existed a “state of 
nature,” as presumed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes.129 Instead, Ferguson 
argued that “all situations are equally natural” and that the “State of Nature” is here.130 The 
basis of Ferguson’s criticism was that a study of natural history should be based upon an 
empirical review of facts and observations, rather than what he described as mere 
“conjecture” or “imagination.”131 “If conjectures and opinions formed at a distance have 
not sufficient authority in the history of mankind, the domestic antiquities of every nation 
must for this reason be received with caution.”132 Still, said Ferguson, it is through the 
telling of traditional fables that a sort of national character emerges.
133
  
According to Ferguson, the legitimacy of government must be found within society 
itself, as opposed to a theoretical “state of nature.”134 In what Ferguson described as “the 
history of mankind in their rudest state,” there are both savages, who are not yet acquainted 
with property, and barbarians, to whom property is a principal object of care and desire, 
though it is not yet ascertained by laws.
135
 Property is, thus, a matter of progress.
136
 Yet, 
Ferguson concluded: 
mankind still retains many parts of their earliest character. They are still averse 
to labour, addicted to war, admirers of fortitude, and, in the language of 
Tacitus, more lavish of their blood than of their sweat.
137
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The foundation of government—what Ferguson calls the “ground of a permanent and 
palpable subordination”—arises to manage the “unequal possessions” accumulated under 
such conditions by every member of a community.
138
 
Although Ferguson also identified a love of equality, a habit of assembling in public 
councils, and a zeal for the tribe to which one belongs, the difficulty in choosing a 
magistrate from among equals suppresses the prospect of a republic in favor of the 
tendency of members of a community to unite behind leaders who are “distinguished by 
their fortunes, and by the lustre of their birth”—the “rudiments of monarchical 
government.”139 Ferguson observed that when “[t]he enemy occupy their thoughts; they 
have no lesure for domestic dissensions.”140 Yet, when the border is secured and the 
monarch turns toward enlarging the “advantages which belong to his station”: 
the follower becomes jealous of rights which are open to encroachment; and 
the parties who united before, from affection and habit, or from a regard to 
their common preservation, disagree in supporting their several claims to 
precedence or profit.
141
 
The “first step toward political establishment, and the desire of a legal constitution” 
occurs when the “sacred names of Liberty, Justice, and Civil Order are made to resound in 
the public assemblies.”142 “To bestow on communities some degree of political freedom,” 
Ferguson noted, “it is perhaps sufficient, that their members, either singly, or as they are 
involved with their several orders, should insist on their rights.”143 Ferguson later 
enumerated a number of specific rights: 
Thus, a person has a right to the use of his faculties and powers; he has a 
right to enjoy the light of the sun, and the air of the atmosphere; he has a right 
to the use of his property, and the fruits of his labour. These are self-evident 
propositions, and the meaning of the term right, which occurs in all of them, 
may be collected from its uniform signification in each. Agreeably to this rule, 
right is the relation of a person to a thing in which no alteration ought to be 
made, without his consent.
144
 
According to Ferguson, the wisest of laws in a free state “are never, perhaps, dictated 
by the interests and spirit of any order of men; they are moved, they are opposed, or 
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amended, by different hands; and come at last to express that medium and compositions 
which contending parties have forced one another to adopt.”145 Ferguson reviewed a 
number of historical republics and concluded:  
In governments properly mixed, the popular interest, finding a counterpoise in 
that of the prince or of the nobles, a balance is actually established between 
them by which the public freedom and the public order are made to conflict.
146
 
Just as nations “must adjust their policy on the prospect of war from abroad, they are 
equally bound to provide for the attainment of peace at home. But there is no peace in the 
absence of justice.”147 Ferguson argued that the keystone of civil liberty is: 
the statute which forces the secrets of every prison to be revealed, the cause of 
every commitment to be declared, and the person of the accused to be 
produced, that he may claim his enlargement, or his trial, within a limited 
time.
148
 
Thus, Ferguson called attention to the importance of personal liberties among public laws. 
The protection of personal liberties, of course, ultimately requires a corresponding restraint 
on government powers. In discussing the tendency of all governments toward corruption, 
Ferguson wrote: 
It is no advantage to a prince, or other magistrate, to enjoy more power 
than is consistent with the good of mankind; nor is it of any benefit to a man to 
be unjust; But these maxims are a feeble security against the passions and 
follies of men.
149
 
Because the hope of a beneficent prince or magistrate is inadequate for the protection of 
liberty, it was, for Ferguson, incumbent upon the individual to guard against infringement 
of personal liberties: 
Liberty is a right which every individual must be ready to vindicate for 
himself, and which he who pretends to bestow as a favour, has by that very act 
in reality denied. Even political establishments, though they appear to be 
independent of the will and arbitration of men, cannot be relied on for the 
preservation of freedom; they may nourish, but should not supersede that firm 
and resolute spirit, with which the liberal mind is always prepared to resist 
indignities, and to refer its safety to itself.
150
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Furthermore, because legislative bodies are equally capable of repressing personal 
liberty, Ferguson recognized the need for checks and balances to be built into a 
constitutional form of government: 
It is well known, that the constitutions framed for the preservation of 
liberty, must consist of many parts; and that senates, popular assemblies, courts 
of justice, magistrates of different orders, must combine to balance each other, 
while they exercise, sustain, or check the executive power.
151
 
The need for such checks and balances, as recognized by Ferguson, would later become 
one of the key issues for debate in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. 
Philosophy of Common Sense 
Thomas Reid,
152
 described by MacCormick as the sternest of Hume’s critics, rejected 
both the moral sense theory of Hutcheson and the sentimentalists themes of Smith and 
Hume in favor of a philosophy of common sense.
153
 Reid is known as the father of 
common sense philosophy.
154
 But Broadie argues that this title is misleading, suggesting 
that if someone deserved to be designated the founder of the “Scottish school of common 
sense philosophy” it would be Reid’s teacher, George Turnbull.155 
Reid suggested that common sense, which he described as an “inward light or sense,” 
is “given by Heaven to different persons in different degrees.”156 Nevertheless, Reid 
contended that “[t]here is a certain degree of it which is necessary to our being subjects of 
law and government, capable of managing our own affairs, and answerable for our conduct 
towards others.”157 Reid divided reason into two offices: the first “is to judge of things self-
evident”; the second “to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are.”158 
The first of these, Reid said, “is the sole province, of common sense.”159   
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According to Reid, “there are principles common to both [philosophers and the 
vulgar] which need no proof, and which do not admit of direct proof.”160 Of such 
“principles taken for granted,” Reid concluded: “All men that have common understanding 
agree in such principles, and consider a man as lunatic or destitute of common sense, who 
denies, or calls them in question.”161 
Reid contended that, while the intention of morals is to teach the duty of men, the 
intention of natural jurisprudence is to teach the rights of men.
162
 According to Reid, the 
“whole end and object of law is to protect the subjects in all that they may lawfully do, or 
possess, or demand.”163 Reid designated as the threefold object of the law (1) the right of 
liberty, (2) the right of property; and (3) a personal right.
164
 Reid rejected Hume’s 
argument that public utility is the only standard of justice.
165
 Thus, Reid provided yet 
another uniquely Scottish perspective advancing liberty as a personal right worthy of 
protection, and he promoted the idea that every rational individual is equipped with the 
inherent ability to recognize basic truths upon which our liberty is founded. 
Summary 
There are, of course, a number of other key Enlightenment thinkers who made 
significant contributions to eighteenth-century Scotland. The thinkers and themes chosen 
for this introduction, however, are selected in anticipation of the discussion, in Chapters 2 
and 3, of the intellectual origins of the United States Constitution. Francis Hutcheson’s 
moral sense, the utilitarian sentiment of David Hume, Adam Smith’s doctrine of sympathy, 
Adam Ferguson’s civil society, and Thomas Reid’s common sense each contributed to the 
notion that the self-evident truths proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence 
compelled the American colonists toward a republican constitution. 
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Chapter 2 
Enlightenment Theory in Colonial America 
Having placed the Scottish Enlightenment within the context of the European 
Enlightenment and the historical setting of eighteenth century Scotland, attention is now 
given to an examination of the historical record revealing Scottish influence in colonial 
America. 
During a period that J.G.A. Pocock refers to as the Machiavellian moment of the 
eighteenth century, Pocock contends that the res publica described in Cato’s Letters was 
“what government was soon to appear in the political theory of David Hume: a device or 
mechanism for requiring men to take long views instead of short, to identify their private 
interests with the general good, to erect an edifice of reason and virtue on a foundation of 
passion; but rather more unequivocally than with Hume it is also a device for bringing men 
out of the cave into the sunlight, from a realm of fantasy into one of reality.”1 According to 
Pocock, “Hume was prepared to accept duality and creative tension between reason and 
passion, authority and liberty” as well as “between the men of real property, who inherited 
liberty in the form of privilege and custom, and the men of mobile property, who affirmed 
it in the form of enlarged knowledge and expanding capacities.”2 Pocock also noted that, 
by the time of Adam Smith, the division of labor and specialization was seen as the driving 
force behind the progression of society “from each phase of its economic history toward 
the next.”3 Pocock then points to a paradox recognized by Adam Ferguson: the premise 
that, as civilization progressed through “the division of labor and the specialization of 
personalities,” the individual “became more and more the dependent of those with whom 
he had contracted to perform specialized functions,” resulting in the personality being 
“impoverished even as it was enriched.”4 The question posed by John Millar was “whether, 
as society progresses to the point where men become capable of liberty and virtue, they do 
not become increasingly exposed to corruption.”5 Pocock concludes that, in the Scottish 
school, “[t]here was now a theory of history which showed how virtue was built up and 
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demolished by the growth of society itself.”6 He denotes this as a Machiavellian moment 
based upon “Machiavelli’s belief that republics never became fully stable or fully virtuous, 
and the fact that political theory based on commerce increasingly showed society polarized 
into those enriched by progress and those impoverished by it, and justified government as a 
necessary evil in a world of specialization and class struggle.”7 Still, Pocock suggests that, 
although Rousseau insisted that the contradiction between personality and society was 
intolerable, “the Scottish school believed that the contradiction between virtue and culture 
might be managed by men in society with good hopes of reasonable success.”8 After 
following the Aristotelian and Machiavellian tradition through the Scottish school, Pocock 
concludes his work with the proposition that the political culture that took shape in 
eighteenth-century America was based upon neoclassical values and concepts of “a civil 
and patriot ideal in which the personality was founded in property, perfected in citizenship 
but perpetually threatened by corruption.”9 According to Pocock, “the theses and antithesis 
of virtue and corruption continued to be one of great importance in shaping American 
thought.”10 By examining the evidence of a Scottish influence upon American thought in 
colonial America, this chapter will begin to explore the competing themes of virtue and 
self-interest in the founding of a constitutional republic. 
Scottish Immigration to America 
According to David M. Walker, in the early eighteenth century, the expansion of the 
Glasgow tobacco trade, the presence of “small but influential colonies of Scottish 
merchants in every port between Florida and Nova Scotia,” and emigration from Scotland 
to America contributed to a “general interest in Scotland about America, and a flow of 
correspondence.”11 Thus, it was not merely the exchange of goods in commerce, but the 
exchange of ideas that defined Scotland’s influence upon America in the eighteenth 
century. 
Andrew Hook notes that Benjamin Franklin was indirectly involved in bringing the 
Scottish clergyman, John Witherspoon, to America to become President of the College of 
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New Jersey.
12
 According to Hook, Witherspoon made a significant contribution to “the 
introduction of Scottish philosophy to America.”13 Douglass G. Adair describes 
Witherspoon as “the most important early popularizer of the Scottish ‘common sense’ 
philosophy of Reid in the United States.”14 Witherspoon also taught a course on Moral 
Philosophy, which included citations to and quotations from Smith, Hutcheson, Hume, and 
Lord Kames, along with Montesquieu, Mandeville, and Locke.
15
 Stanley Elkins and Eric 
McKitrick contend that Witherspoon’s primary contribution to his students, including 
James Madison, was in teaching them, by his own example, to be selective in their 
adoption of Enlightenment ideas; for example, Witherspoon saw Hutcheson’s moral 
philosophy as deplorably superficial, and yet Witherspoon fully endorsed Hutcheson’s 
discussions of the conditions under which colonies and mother country ought to separate.
16
 
Likewise, while Witherspoon was critical of Hume’s skepticism, in Witherspoon’s 
Lectures on Eloquence Hume received the highest praise.
17
 It seems that the part of the 
spirit of the Enlightenment that Witherspoon brought with him from Edinburgh was the 
principle, as Elkins and McKitrick note, that those who suspect a thing of being pernicious 
“ought to acquaint themselves with it, they must know what it is, if they mean to shew that 
it is false.”18 Indeed, David Fate Norton argues that the political philosophies of Hutcheson 
and Witherspoon seem inseparable, a point he relies upon as support for his claim that 
“Hutcheson’s teachings were a significant factor in the movement toward independence.”19 
Significantly, Witherspoon was a signer of both the Declaration of Independence and the 
Articles of Confederation.
20
 In addition to Madison, delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 who studied under Witherspoon included William C. Houston and 
Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, Gunning Bedford, Jr. of Delaware, and William R. Davie 
of North Carolina.
21
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In 1755, Francis Alison was appointed Vice-Provost and Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at the newly-established College of Philadelphia.
22
 According to Norton, 
“Hutcheson’s views received their widest colonial hearing, and had the greatest impact” in 
Pennsylvania due to the influence of Alison, who had received an M.A. from Edinburgh in 
1732, and may have studied with Hutcheson in Glasgow or, perhaps, Dublin.
23
 Norton 
points out that student notes from Alison’s lectures on moral philosophy reflect extensive 
paraphrases of Hutcheson’s views on the design of human nature, the nature of virtue, and 
the operation of the moral sense.
24
 
James Wilson was an immigrant from Scotland who had been educated at St. 
Andrews, Edinburgh, and Glasgow.
25
 Walker, who notes that Wilson was born at 
Carskerdo in Fife in 1742, and studied at St. Andrews in 1757-59, contends that the 
tradition that Wilson attended Glasgow University sometime between 1759 and 1763, and 
Edinburgh University from 1763 to 1765, has not been confirmed.
26
 If true, however—as 
Walker points out—it is quite possible that Wilson attended lectures of Adam Smith, who 
was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, and John Millar, who was Regius 
Professor of Law at Glasgow, during the relevant period.
27
 Likewise, Adam Ferguson was 
Chair of Natural Philosophy, and later of Moral Philosophy, at Edinburgh when Wilson 
was said to have been in the college there.
28
 William Ewald’s more recent research relies 
upon library borrowing records to confirm Wilson’s attendance at St. Andrews between 
1757 and 1759 and at the University of Glasgow during the years 1764 to 1765.
29
 In 1765, 
Wilson immigrated to America, became a Latin tutor at the College of Philadelphia, and 
read law in the office of John Dickinson.
30
 After publishing a pamphlet entitled, 
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British 
Parliament, which was widely read for the proposition that Parliament had no authority 
over the colonies, Wilson was elected to the Second Continental Congress and signed the 
Declaration of Independence.
31
 In 1782, Wilson was appointed as a delegate to the 
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Confederation Congress, where he met Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.
32
 Wilson 
was one of the few men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution.
33
 
Reading the Scottish Enlightenment 
Mark G. Spencer notes that Hume’s Enquiries circulated widely in colonial 
America.
34
 Indeed, as recorded on an Invoice of Books for the Library Company of 
Philadelphia, sent from London in August 1752, to Benjamin Franklin, Hume’s Political 
Discourses and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals were included in one of 
America’s earliest public libraries.35 According to Spencer, although Hume’s philosophy 
was as often the subject of censure as it was the subject of praise, there is no doubt that it 
was the subject of a “steady stream of debate” in early America.36 
In 1761, Franklin’s efforts to share the literary works of Great Britain with the 
colonies was evidenced by an invoice and bill of lading sent to the treasurer of the Library 
Company of Philadelphia, for a collection of books ordered for the Philadelphia library.
37
 
The invoice included two works by Lord Kames: Historical Law-Tracts and Principles of 
Equity.
38
 
In January 1765, John Adams recorded in his diary that he had been invited to join a 
proposed law club, “a private association for the study of law and oratory.”39 Among the 
first works Adams read for discussion by the Sodalitas Club were Lord Kames’ Historical 
Law-Tracts and Essays Upon Several Subjects Concerning British Antiquities.
40
 On 21 
February 1765, Adams noted that the club had given rise to his own thinking, which he 
would commit to writing, and which afterward would be published in the Boston Gazette 
as A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law.
41
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Hook identifies the library of Thomas Jefferson as the most notable colonial 
collection of works by the major figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, including Francis 
Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, Lord Kames, 
Hugh Blair, William Robertson, David Gregory, Colin Maclaurin, and William Cullen.
42
 
Gary Wills notes that Jefferson included both Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind 
and John Locke’s Conduct of the Mind on a basic library list compiled in 1771 for a 
friend.
43
 In his letter to Robert Skipwith, Jefferson wrote, “Of Politicks and Trade I have 
given you a few only of the best books, as you would probably chuse to be not 
unacquainted with those commercial principles which bring wealth into our country, and 
the constitutional security we have for the enjoiment of that wealth.”44 In addition to those 
identified by Wills, Jefferson also included, on the list of recommended reading, Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Locke’s Essay Concerning Civil Government, and Hume’s 
Essays and History of England.
45
  
Jefferson was influenced by both Hutcheson and the Scottish Common Sense school 
of philosophy, which McDonald describes as holding “that all adult human beings are 
endowed with a moral sense—an innate knowledge of what is right and what is wrong, of 
what is good and what is evil—and a disposition to do good.”46 As a student at the College 
of William and Mary, Jefferson himself studied under William Small of Scotland, the 
Professor of Mathematics, and later the interim philosophical chair, whom Jefferson 
described as “a man profound in most of the useful branches of science, with a happy 
talent of communication, correct and gentlemanly manners, and an enlarged and liberal 
mind.”47 Years later, however, in August 1787, Jefferson advised his nephew, Peter Carr, a 
student at the College of William and Mary, not to waste his time attending lectures in 
moral philosophy.
48
 According to Jefferson, because the “moral sense, or conscience, is as 
much a part of man as his leg or arm,” if a moral case is stated “to a ploughman and a 
professor . . . [t]he former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he 
has not been led astray by artificial rules.”49 Wills notes that Jefferson’s reference to a 
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“plowman and a professor” was reflective of Reid’s idea “of the moral sense that is equal 
in all men.”50 On a list of recommended readings, accompanying Jefferson’s letter to Carr, 
he included Hume’s History and Essays, as well as Locke’s Essays and Conduct of the 
Mind.
51
 Though it is impossible to ascertain which Enlightenment thinker influenced 
Jefferson the most, a number of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, including Lord Kames, 
Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and David Hume, figured prominently in Jefferson’s 
Commonplace Book.
52
 
In October 1773, George Washington ordered materials for repairs and alterations to 
Mount Vernon, as well as “Books for the use of Mr Custis, to whom they are to be 
charged.”53 The list of seventeen books for John Parke Custis’ studies included several 
significant works of the Scottish Enlightenment, including Hutcheson’s Introduction to 
Moral Philosophy, Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral 
Philosophy, George Turnbull’s Principles of Moral Philosophy, and Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments.
54
 Samuel Fleischacker cites Washington’s purchase of these books as 
evidence that they were being used in the college curriculum of the day, based on the fact 
that they were to be sent to Custis at King’s College.55 
Benjamin Vaughn, writing from Essex on 27 January 1777, sent to Franklin in Paris 
a few maps and books, including Smith’s recently-published Wealth of Nations.56 William 
Cushing returned two volumes of Hume’s History to John Adams in January 1777, with a 
request to borrow additional volumes.
57
 Likewise, in April 1781 Alexander Hamilton 
asked to borrow a copy of Hume’s Political Discourses from Colonel Timothy Pickering.58 
In a letter to Robert Morris, dated April 30, 1781, discussing the need to restore the public 
credit, Hamilton quotes both Hume and Smith.
59
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In 1783, James Madison presented the report of a congressional committee appointed 
to prepare a list of books to be imported for the use of Congress.
60
 Although many of the 
books on the list of about 550 titles concerned American topics, Hook identifies about a 
dozen works representing the Scottish Enlightenment, including Hutcheson’s A System of 
Moral Philosophy; Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral Philosophy and his Essay on the History 
of Civil Society; Hume’s History of England and Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects; 
Millar’s The Origin of the Distinctions of Ranks; and Smith’s Wealth of Nations.61 
In May 1783, John Adams wrote to his son, advising him “to have a Book of 
Amusement, to read, along with your Severe Studies and laborious Exercises,” and 
recommended as such, “Books of Morals,” including the writings of Francis Hutcheson.62 
Travel and Correspondence 
Hook begins his study of cultural relations between America and Scotland with a 
1759 visit by Benjamin Franklin to Scotland.
63
 At St. Andrews, Franklin was made a Guild 
Brother of the town and given a formal reception by the university faculty.
64
 In February 
1759, St. Andrews University awarded Franklin an honorary Doctor of Laws degree for his 
work with electricity.
65
 In Edinburgh, Franklin met and was entertained by David Hume; 
Henry Home, Lord Kames; Adam Ferguson; and others, including Adam Smith.
66
 Hook 
notes that Franklin was subsequently influential in sponsoring a number of American 
medical students in their studies at Edinburgh, and to a lesser degree, the awarding of 
honorary Doctor of Divinity degrees by Scottish Universities to several American 
ministers.
67
  
In 1760, Franklin wrote Lord Kames to report that he was reading “with great 
Pleasure and Improvement,” Kames’ Principles of Equity, which Franklin noted would be 
of great advantage to the judges in the Colonies.
68
 Also in 1760, Franklin wrote to Hume, 
saying he was pleased “to hear of your Change of Sentiments in some particulars relating 
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to America; because I think it of Importance to our general Welfare that the People of this 
Nation should have right Notions of us, and I know no one that has it more in his Power to 
rectify their Notions, than Mr. Hume.”69 Franklin’s correspondence revealed his 
recognition that the colonies benefitted not only from the receipt of knowledge and ideas 
from the great thinkers of Scotland, but also from the favorable influence his 
correspondents might have in Great Britain with respect to the American colonies. 
In 1762, Franklin wrote a letter to Hume, which was subsequently published by the 
Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, regarding the method of preserving buildings from 
damage by lightning.
70
 In response, Hume commented that, though America had sent gold, 
silver, sugar, tobacco, and indigo to Scotland, Franklin was “the first Philosopher, and 
indeed the first Great Man of Letters for whom we are beholden to her.”71 
Franklin visited Scotland again in 1771.
72
 In January 1772, Franklin wrote to his son 
about his visit to Scotland, during which he “spent 5 days with Lord Kaims . . . two or 
three Days at Glasgow, two Days at Carron Iron Works, and the rest of the Month in and 
about Edinburgh, lodging at David Hume’s, who entertain’d me with the greatest of 
Kindness and Hospitality, as did Lord Kaims and his Lady.”73 Walker notes that Franklin 
met with Hume, Kames, and Ferguson in Edinburgh and with Millar in Glasgow.
74
 
Scottish Influence on Colonial American Writings 
In A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, published in 1765, Adams was 
critical of the feudal system as “inconsistent with the constitution of human nature.”75 In 
noting that many “celebrated modern writers in Europe have espoused the same 
sentiments,” Adams quoted Lord Kames’ British Antiquities: “Lord Kaims, a Scottish 
writer of great reputation, whose authority in this case ought to have the more weight, as 
his countrymen have not the most worthy ideas of liberty, speaking of the feudal law, says, 
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‘A constitution so contradictory to all the principles which govern mankind, can never be 
brought about, one should imagine, but by foreign conquest or native usurpations.’”76 
In The Farmer Refuted, Alexander Hamilton quoted Hume—referring to him only as 
a “celebrated author.”77 Hamilton noted, as an established maxim that: 
in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and 
controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave; and to 
have no other end in his actions, but private interest. By this interest, we must 
govern him, and by means of it, make him co-operate to public good, 
notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, we shall in 
vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find in the end, that 
we have no security for our liberties and possessions, except the good will of 
our rulers; that is, we should have no security at all.
78
  
Hamilton also cited Hume for the proposition that “the authority of the British Parliament 
over America, would, in all probability, be a more intolerable and excessive species of 
despotism than an absolute monarchy.”79 According to Henry May, Hume’s skeptical view 
that men are far more influenced by their passions than their reason played an important 
role in the political theory of Hamilton, whom May describes as the most skeptical of 
American major statesmen.
80
 
Hamilton subsequently argued, in The Continentalist No. V, that Hume’s essay, Of 
the Jealousy of Trade, had been misapprehended by those who opposed all regulation of 
trade.
81
 Hamilton contended that Hume’s “object was to combat that excessive jealousy on 
this head,” but that it “was no part of his design to insinuate that the regulating hand of 
government was either useless, or hurtful.”82 Hamilton argued that “to militate against all 
interference by the sovereign [is] an extreme as little reconcilable with experience, or 
common sense, as the practice it was first framed to discredit.”83 
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Chapter 3 
An Enlightened Path to a Constitutional Republic 
This chapter examines the philosophical debates from the Declaration of 
Independence through the Confederation and the drafting of the Constitution. 
Declaration of Independence 
According to Caroline Robbins, for an explicit statement of “when it is that colonies 
may turn independent,” one must turn to the work of Francis Hutcheson.1 Robbins notes 
that Hutcheson believed in an extensive religious liberty, wished for reform of 
representative institutions to insure a proper relation between the individual and the state, 
and sought a measure of economic liberty within the just bounds of general welfare.
2
 
Robbins points out that Hutcheson applied the criterion of the greatest good in defining just 
and unjust war in his System of Moral Philosophy: “In short in foreign as in colonial policy 
that is best which considers most fully the welfare of all mankind.”3 As Norton puts it, 
“Hutcheson insists that there are clear limits to [the] powers of the state, and that citizens 
have always the right to resist the excesses of a government of any form, and even the right 
to overthrow and replace a government.”4 More specifically, Hutcheson considered the 
rights of mother countries over colonies: “There is something so unnatural in supposing a 
large society, sufficient for all the good purposes of an independent political union, 
remaining subject to the direction and government of a distant body of men who know not 
sufficiently the circumstances and exigencies of this society; or in supposing this society 
obliged to be governed solely for the benefit of a distant country; that it is not easy to 
imagine there can be any foundation for it in justice or equity.”5 
In Inventing America, Gary Wills looks for evidence of the Scottish Enlightenment in 
Thomas Jefferson’s draft of the Declaration of Independence. Wills sees shades of Hume 
and Hutcheson in Jefferson’s invocation of the words “course” and “event,” respectively, 
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in the opening line of the Declaration.
6
 Notwithstanding the longstanding association of 
Jefferson with Locke, and indeed early accusations that Jefferson plagiarized Locke in his 
draft of the Declaration, Wills contends that there are more echoes of Montesquieu than 
Locke in the Declaration of Independence.
7
 As a specific example of Wills’ thesis that 
Locke’s influence has been overrated, Wills argues that the “self-evident truth” that “all 
men are created equal” is of the kind that “can be arrived at by certain evidence”; and is, 
thus, not self-evident in the Lockean sense.
8
 According to Wills, Jefferson thought that 
equality of the moral sense was a scientifically observable fact.
9
 Moreover, Wills points to 
Jefferson’s statement—that his aim in writing the Declaration was “to place before 
mankind the common sense of the subject”—as evidence that Jefferson was using “self-
evident” in Reid’s sense.10 As support, Wills quotes Reid as saying, “Moral truths, 
therefore, may be divided into two classes, to wit: such as are self-evident to every man 
whose understanding and moral faculty are ripe, and such as are deduced by reasoning 
from those that are self-evident.”11 Wills then finds common ground in Jefferson’s and 
Hutcheson’s understanding that all men are equal in their exercise of the moral sense as 
man’s highest faculty.12 
Samuel Fleischacker contends that “the debate between the Scottish and the 
Hobbesian-Lockean view of the founders is part of a larger controversy over whether the 
political philosophy expressed in the American Declaration of Independence is primarily a 
‘liberal’ or a ‘civil republican’ one.”13 Fleischacker agrees with Wills that, on the 
occasions when Jefferson wrote on moral philosophy, he seems to identify himself with 
Hutcheson’s moral sense doctrine.14 With regard to the Declaration of Independence, 
however, Fleischacker maintains that Jefferson was quoting Locke.
15
 According to 
Fleischacker, Wills exaggerates the distance between Hutcheson’s and Locke’s political 
philosophy: “Hutcheson, Hume and Smith all begin with Locke, if only to disagree with 
him, when they discuss property, the state of nature, the functions of government and the 
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right to resistance. All three, moreover, accept Locke’s conclusion, as against Hobbes, that 
resistance to government is sometimes legitimate, although Hume rejects Locke’s 
reasoning for that conclusion and offers his own alternative.”16 
Morton White argues that Jefferson held “that it may be discovered by reason that all 
men are created equal in the sense of having been given the same nature and advantages.”17 
But White also acknowledged the “impact of what is called the doctrine of moral sense on 
American thought in the revolutionary period.”18 As White noted, Locke “regarded logical 
demonstration from self-evident principles as the way in which a philosopher would show 
them to be true. And it was this insistence on seeking final support from reason so 
conceived that made Locke’s rationalism unacceptable to the most radical advocates of the 
doctrine of moral sense.”19  
Andrew Reck notes that Jefferson’s enumeration of rights—“Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness”—rather than the life, liberty, and property, was a movement away 
from Locke’s theory of rights, which would have given property first priority, in favor of 
Hutcheson’s theory of perfect natural rights, which “underscores the freedom of the 
individual to live as he chooses as long as he does not harm others.”20 For Reck, however, 
the choice of happiness over property was not an outright rejection of Locke—who, Reck 
notes, “taught that Happiness alone ‘moves desire’ and introduced the phrase ‘pursuit of 
happiness’”—but simply a reflection of Thomas Jefferson’s and Benjamin Franklin’s view 
that property was a civil right rather than a natural right.
21
 Reck concludes more broadly 
that “[i]n style and substance the Declaration of Independence stands out as a document of 
Enlightenment thought and political action.”22 
Forrest McDonald contends that, by the time they had declared their independence, 
many Americans had become reasonably well versed in republican principles of political 
theory, studying as college students the history of the ancient republics, Montesquieu’s 
analysis of republic principles, and, in particular, David Hume’s argument that England 
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was closer to a republic than an absolute monarchy.
23
 McDonald divides American schools 
of republican thought (to the extent such principles are subject to systematic 
categorization) into two categories: puritan and agrarian.
24
 Either way, says McDonald, the 
common principle of republics was public virtue.
25
 Puritanical republicanism “sought a 
moral solution to the problem of the mortality of republics (make better people).”26 When 
viewed from the puritan perspective, republican liberty was totalitarian: “one was free to 
do that, and only that, which was in the interest of the public, the liberty of the individual 
being subsumed in the freedom or independence of his political community.”27 According 
to McDonald, agrarian republicanism “believed in a socio-economic-political solution 
(make better arrangements).”28 
Revolutionary War and the Confederation 
Bernard Bailyn notes that “[m]ost conspicuous in the writings of the Revolutionary 
period was the heritage of classical antiquity.”29 According to Bailyn, however, the 
learning behind “this elaborate display of classical authors” was often superficial.30 While, 
to Bailyn, the classics of ancient thought were illustrative of thought, more “directly 
influential in shaping the thought of the Revolutionary generation were the ideas and 
attitudes associated with the writings of Enlightenment rationalism.”31 
Although Adam Ferguson himself journeyed to America in 1778 as the secretary of 
Lord Carlisle’s Peace Commission, he was not received by Congress,32 and the 
Commissioners’ offer of “self-rule” was rejected as “a combination of fraud, falsehood, 
insidious offers, and abuse of France, Concluding with a denial of Independence.”33 
John Adams quoted Hume extensively in his Defense of the Constitutions of 
Government of the United States, published in 1787, particularly with regard to the need to 
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achieve a balance of power between the rich and the poor.
34
 Adams, however, was critical 
of Hume’s “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth” as a complicated aristocracy.35 In his 
chapter summarizing the “Opinions of Historians,” Adams introduced Hume’s “Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth” as follows: 
Americans in this age are too enlightened to be bubbled out of their 
liberties, even by such mighty names as Locke, Milton, Turgot, or Hume; they 
know that popular elections of one essential branch of the legislature, 
frequently repeated, are the only possible means of forming a free constitution, 
or of preserving the government of laws from the domination of men, or of 
preserving their lives, liberties, or properties in security; they know, though 
Locke and Milton did not, that when popular elections are given up, liberty and 
free government must be given up. Upon this principle, they cannot approve 
the plan of Mr. Hume, in his “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.”36 
After quoting Hume’s plan for town elections of county representatives; the subsequent 
election, by the county representatives, of county magistrates and a senator; wherein the 
senators would possess the whole executive power and the representatives would possess 
the whole legislative power, but requiring all new laws to first be debated in the senate 
before being sent to the representatives; and where the senate would chose a protector and 
executive council, Adams concluded: 
If you compare this plan, as well as those of Locke and Milton, with the 
principles and examples, you will soon form a judgment of them; it is not my 
design to enlarge upon them. That of Hume is a complicated aristocracy, and 
would soon behave like all other aristocracies.
37
 
Rather than vest the whole executive power in a senate as Hume had proposed, Adams 
suggested that a preferable improvement to the English constitution would be proportional 
representation of small districts in a House of Commons as “a guardian of natural 
liberty.”38 
Constitutional Convention 
The Confederation Congress adopted a resolution on 21 February 1787, calling for a 
convention to establish a “firm national government” that would render the federal 
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constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.
39
 
On 25 May 1787, a quorum of seven states convened in Philadelphia and organized a 
Constitutional Convention, which remained in session until 17 September 1787.
40
  
A significant concern leading up to the Constitutional Convention was whether the 
American public possessed sufficient virtue to sustain a republic.
41
 According to 
McDonald, advocates of several competing positions were present at the Convention: (1) 
those who would “give up on republicanism and restore a more authoritative form of 
government, monarchical or otherwise”; (2) those who sought to “create a more virtuous 
public by means of education, by setting good examples, or by making it the interest of 
individuals to strive for the public good”; or (3) those who preferred “to establish 
republican government upon principles other than virtue, upon the assumption that most 
men, most of the time, would act out of motives of self-interest rather than of the public 
interest.”42  
An influential group of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, which McDonald 
describes as the “court-party nationalists,” were “in agreement that in framing a 
constitution, it was prudent to act on the assumption that most men in government would 
put their own interests ahead of the public interest much of the time.”43 McDonald includes 
among the court-party nationalists such patriots as George Washington of Virginia, 
Nathaniel Gorham and Rufus King of Massachusetts, Alexander Hamilton of New York, 
and Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson of Pennsylvania.
44
 McDonald also identifies 
some “probable” candidates for inclusion on his list of court-party nationalists, including, 
most notably, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania.
45
 James Madison of Virginia and 
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina agreed with the nationalists on many points, but 
McDonald would put them in a class by themselves.
46
 
What McDonald describes as a “country party” of “republican ideologues” consisted 
of those delegates to the Convention who, as McDonald puts it, “shrank with horror at the 
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prospect of admitting the baser passions as operating principles of government.”47 
McDonald notes that Montesquieu had “warned against entrusting people with power if it 
was to their personal advantage to abuse it” whereas “Hume, by contrast, had contended 
that corruption in the form of the power to manage Parliament by passing out lucrative 
offices was necessary to the balance of the British constitution.”48 McDonald assigns those 
delegates, including (among others) George Mason of Virginia, Robert Yates of New 
York, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts—who 
“insisted upon the absolute exclusion of congressmen from other offices during and for a 
time after their service in Congress”—as corresponding to the country party in England.49   
Between the court-party nationalists and republican ideologues, as McDonald 
describes them, there stood a few delegates, like James Madison of Virginia, who were 
willing to propose a compromise.
50
 In To Begin the World Anew, Bailyn quotes Madison as 
saying both that, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” and that if 
there “[i]s no virtue among us . . . [n]o theoretical checks—no form of Government, can 
render us secure.”51 Indeed McDonald argues that the Convention resulted, not in a 
resolution of these questions of political theory, so much as a series of pragmatic 
compromises of the large-state/small-state differences and the competing economic 
interests between the North and South.
52
 
Stephen A. Conrad would, perhaps, take issue with McDonald placing James Wilson 
squarely in the “court party,” as distinguished from the “country party.” According to 
Conrad, Wilson’s vision encompassed a “reconciliation” of the “two republican ideals so 
often supposed to be at odds with one another.”53 For Wilson, “there can be no real 
incompatibility between the discharge of one’s publick, and that of his private duty.”54 
Wilson was also the delegate to the Constitutional Convention who proposed the solution 
to the anti-federalist objection to the plan to divide sovereignty between the national and 
state governments—seemingly an impossibility under the political theory of the day.55 On 
19 June 1787, Wilson observed “that by a Natl. Govt. he did not mean one that would 
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swallow up the State Govts. as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen.”56 During a 
debate (on 25 June 1787) regarding the election of senators, Wilson explained his 
opposition to an election by state legislatures by observing “the twofold relation” in which 
the people would stand: first, as citizens of the general government, and second, as citizens 
of their particular state—both were derived from the people and, therefore, “ought to be 
regulated on the same principles.”57 
Although McDonald identifies Elbridge Gerry—because of his support for a strict 
ban on members of Congress serving in any public office for a period of time after their 
service in Congress—as a country party republican, there are times when Gerry’s 
arguments sounded more like those of a court-party skeptic. When, for example, the 
question of whether the members of the first branch of the legislature ought to be elected 
by the people of the several states was taken up on 31 May 1787, Gerry, a delegate from 
Massachusetts, argued for their election by the state legislatures. As an example of why 
popular elections were not reliable as a source of sound governance, Gerry cited what he 
apparently viewed to be an uninformed and misled popular clamor in Massachusetts to 
reduce the salaries of government administrators: “The evils we experience flow from the 
excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue; but are the dupes of pretended 
patriots.”58 It appears that Gerry recognized the limitations of virtue as a basis for 
government, and the need, through adequate pay, to motivate public servants by appealing 
to their self-interests. In passing, however, Gerry’s comments also revealed his lack of 
confidence in the competence of the people to govern themselves. 
On 2 June 1787, Benjamin Franklin (through a written speech read by Wilson) 
advanced an opinion that no salaries should be allowed public officers, which reflected 
Hume’s sentiment on ambition and avarice59: 
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs 
of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of 
money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; 
but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most 
violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men a post of honour that shall at 
the same time be a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to 
obtain it.
60
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Thus, Doctor Franklin, even in arguing a position contrary to that presented by Gerry, 
likewise acknowledged in the early days of the Convention the need to account for the 
influence of human passions in formulating a system of government. Incidentally, 
Franklin’s speech is an example, as McDonald contends, of the Convention delegates’ 
frequent reliance upon political theorists without attribution; noting as an example that 
delegates often quoted or paraphrased Hume without acknowledging that they were doing 
so.
61
 
Contrary to Gerry’s argument for election of the first branch of the legislature by the 
state legislatures, Wilson supported the popular election of at least one branch of the 
legislature. Wilson observed: “There is no danger of improper elections if made by large 
districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an 
opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.”62 Madison also advanced the 
idea of an extended republic to protect the minority from oppression by a majority of a 
small district.
63
 But, as William Ewald points out, Madison, particularly in the early days 
of the Convention, was more interested in granting the Senate with an absolute negative on 
the laws of the states to strike down unjust and inequitable laws, whereas Wilson relied 
upon “a principle of dividing and balancing the respective spheres of authority so that the 
settled popular will can find expression in the actions of the government.”64 
Alexander Hamilton addressed the Convention on 22 June 1787, regarding the 
question of barring members of Congress from executive office during their membership 
and for one year thereafter. In recognizing the “inconveniences on both sides” of the issue, 
Hamilton, as recorded by Madison, stated that, “if we expect him to serve the public [we] 
must interest his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the source of 
many of our errors.”65 Thus, Hamilton did not seek to avoid any opportunity for passions 
to influence government, but, instead, to place competing passions in balance to maintain 
an equilibrium. Robert Yates reported these comments by Hamilton on corruption as 
follows: “Hume's opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark, that there is 
always a body of firm patriots, who often shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as 
they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions.”66 According to McDonald, 
however, it is a mistake to assume that Hamilton, or the court-party nationalists, “cynically 
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abandoned the whole notion of virtue in the republic and opted to substitute crass self-
interest in its stead.”67 Instead, the court-party nationalists, says McDonald, sought to err 
on the side of prudence by preparing for the worst, while expecting something better from 
the statesmen who would govern a republic.
68
  
On 7 August 1787, Franklin argued against a motion by Gouverneur Morris to limit 
the right of suffrage to freeholders for the purpose of electing members of the House of 
Representatives: “It is of great consequence that we shd. not depress the virtue & public 
spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and 
which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it.”69 The motion to impose a 
freeholder requirement failed.
70
 
Just two days later (on 9 August 1787), Morris, having been rebuffed by Franklin’s 
appeal to reason (rather than prejudice) on the issue of popular suffrage, himself appealed 
to reason in his failed attempt to increase the citizenship requirement for Senators to 
fourteen years: “The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our 
reason, and as little by our feelings as possible.”71 
On 20 August 1787, after the Committee on Detail presented its report to the 
Convention, Charles Pinckney submitted various propositions, including the proposed 
protections of the writ of habeas corpus and liberty of the press.
72
 On 12 September 1787, 
when the Committee on Style presented the draft Constitution, Hugh Williamson of North 
Carolina observed that no provision had been made for juries in civil cases and suggested 
the necessity of such a guarantee.
73
 Gerry proposed that the Committee be “directed to 
provide a clause for securing the trial by Juries.”74 This prompted George Mason to say 
that he “wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a Motion 
if made for the purpose—It would give great quiet to the people; and with the aid of the 
State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.”75 Gerry moved for a committee 
to prepare a bill of rights, which Mason seconded as promised.
76
 Roger Sherman objected: 
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“The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force 
are sufficient.”77 Notwithstanding Mason’s admonition that “[t]he Laws of the U.S. are to 
be paramount to State Bills of Rights,” the Convention voted unanimously (with 
Massachusetts absent) against the motion.
78
 
On 14 September 1787, Pinckney and Gerry again moved to insert a declaration “that 
the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed,” but it was again defeated, this time 
by a vote of seven to four.
79
 On 15 September 1787, Mason once more objected, without 
success, to the Constitution on the ground that there was no declaration of rights.
80
 Thus, 
the seeds of popular support for what would become the Bill of Rights were planted during 
the last days of the Constitutional Convention. 
According to May, the Constitution framed at the Convention reflects all the virtues 
of what he describes as the Moderate Enlightenment, and also one of its faults: “the belief 
that everything can be settled by compromise.”81 As May put it, “One of the Convention’s 
sets of compromises turned out to be not only immoral but unworkable,” referring to the 
slave trade clause, which was intended to lay the foundation for banishing slavery, but 
deferred, until 1808, congressional prohibition of only the importation of slaves.
82
 
Enlightenment Influences on the Framers of the Proposed Constitution 
Eighteenth-century American political philosophy posed, and attempted to answer, 
many of the same questions considered by the key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
To be sure, the Americans were also influenced by other, non-Scottish thinkers of the 
Enlightenment period, as well as by classical philosophers. Yet the exchange of both 
commerce and ideas between Scotland and America should not be ignored. From the 
extensive travels of Benjamin Franklin in Scotland, to the reading of and citation to Hume 
by Alexander Hamilton, to the instruction received by the Framers who studied at the 
College of New Jersey under the leadership of the Scottish-educated John Witherspoon, 
the generation of Americans who were sent to the Philadelphia convention to “render the 
federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 
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Union” was broadly familiar with the political ideas and debate that had emerged from the 
Scottish Enlightenment. 
Framers like Elbridge Gerry understood that it was human nature to be motivated by 
ambition as well as virtue. Thus, Gerry warned the other Convention delegates to guard 
against corruption in public service by making adequate provision for those employed in 
the administration of government. Gerry sought to advance the public interest by appealing 
to the self-interest of public servants. Benjamin Franklin, on the contrary, argued that no 
salaries should be paid to public officials to remove the passion of avarice as a motivation 
for government service. While the Convention debates do not suggest that the delegates 
sought to resolve this question as a matter of political theory, they ultimately made a 
decision, which was practical as much as it was philosophical, that senators and 
representatives, the president, and judges shall receive compensation for their services.
83
 
Gerry’s lack of confidence in popular elections, however, was not persuasive to a 
majority of the state delegations at the Constitutional Convention. In this instance, the 
Convention reached a pragmatic compromise by delegating the election of two senators 
from each state to the legislature thereof. But in authorizing the direct election of 
representatives (the number of which were apportioned among the states according to 
population) and providing an option to the states for the direct election of presidential 
electors, the Framers consciously judged the people of the new republic competent to 
participate in self-governance. Indeed, Reid’s uniquely Scottish perspective of liberty as a 
personal right worthy of protection and the idea that every rational individual is equipped 
with the inherent ability to recognize basic truths upon which liberty is founded were 
among the first principles upon which the foundation of the American constitutional 
republic was built. James Wilson, like Reid, contended that government “should be formed 
to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; and every 
government, which has not this in view, as its principal object, is not a government of the 
legitimate kind.”84 Moreover, Wilson’s plan of dual sovereignty was based upon the 
concept that both the federal government and the state government were derived from the 
people.  
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Late in life, Jefferson wrote a letter to Henry Lee discussing both the object of the 
Declaration of Independence and the intellectual authorities relied upon in preparing his 
draft: 
When forced, therefore, to resort to arms for redress, an appeal to the tribunal 
of the world was deemed proper for our justification. This was the object of the 
Declaration of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new 
arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never 
been said before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, 
in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify ourselves 
in the independent stand we are compelled to take. Neither aiming at 
originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and 
previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind, 
and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the 
occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, 
whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the 
elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c.”85 
(emphasis added). Thus, Jefferson did not claim to be advancing an entirely new 
philosophy in the Declaration of Independence. The same can be said of the Constitution 
proposed by the Constitutional Convention and the constitutional republic founded with its 
adoption. The true genius of the founding documents lay in its synthesis of often 
competing ideas. Like the literati of the Scottish Enlightenment, the Founders were able to 
debate these competing ideas and find truth wherever it existed, regardless of party label or 
prior loyalties. Thus, the Constitution was a written charter crafted by a small group of 
diverse, yet wise, individuals, “in Order to form a more perfect Union.” Both the debate 
over its continued imperfections and efforts to make it even more perfect will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Ratification of the Constitution 
When the proposed Constitution was presented to the states for ratification by the 
people, assembled in state conventions, many of the same themes debated at the 
Constitutional Convention entered the popular debate, through speeches delivered and 
distributed in printed form prior to the state conventions, through widely-circulated 
political pamphlets (including, most notably, The Federalist Papers), and through 
deliberations at the state conventions. 
Proposed Constitution Presented to the States 
On 17 September 1787, the Convention resolved that the “Constitution be laid before 
the United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that 
it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the 
People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and 
Ratification . . . .”1 The proposed Constitution was received by Congress on 20 September 
1787.
2
 Congress adopted a resolution on 28 September 1787 that the report of the 
Convention be transmitted to the state legislatures “in order to be submitted to a 
convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof.”3 
Ratification Debates 
Power of the People 
Following the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson delivered an address to a 
Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, “to elucidate and explain the principles and 
arrangements of the constitution that has been submitted to the consideration of the United 
States.”4 Wilson’s speech, delivered on 6 October 1787, came to be known as the “State 
House Yard Speech” and was widely distributed throughout the United States.5 Wilson 
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described what he called “the leading discrimination between the state constitutions, and 
the constitution of the United States.”6 According to Wilson: 
When the people established the powers of legislation under their separate 
governments, they invested their representatives with every right and authority 
which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question, 
respecting the jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government 
is silent, the jurisdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating foederal 
powers, another criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional 
authority is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive 
grant expressed in the instrument of union. Hence it is evident, that in the 
former case every thing which is not reserved is given, but in the latter the 
reverse of the proposition prevails, and every thing which is not given, is 
reserved.
7
 
Thus, Wilson assumed an early and significant role in promoting the concept of limited, 
enumerated powers for the proposed national government, both at the Constitutional 
Convention and during ratification. 
At the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson also addressed what, for Wilson, 
was likely the most American feature of the proposed government: the notion that the 
principle of representation was not confined to the lower house of the legislature, as with 
the House of Commons, but was diffused “through all the constituent parts of 
government”—legislative, executive, and judicial.8 
On 4 December 1787, Wilson again rose at his state’s ratifying convention to 
respond to critics of the proposed Constitution, who argued that, because there cannot be 
two sovereign powers, the sovereignty of the states could not be preserved.
9
 In this 
instance, Wilson cited Locke in arguing that “the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable 
authority remains with the people.”10 On 11 December 1787, Wilson further argued at the 
ratifying convention that the proposed government was founded, not upon a compact, but 
upon the power of the people.
11
 According to Wilson: 
The greatest part of governments have been founded on conquest: 
perhaps a few early ones may have had their origin in paternal authority. 
Sometimes a family united, and that family afterwards extended itself into a 
community. But the greatest governments which have appeared on the face of 
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the globe have been founded in conquest. The great empires of Assyria, Persia, 
Macedonia, and Rome, were all of this kind. I know well that in Great Britain, 
since the revolution, it has become a principle that the constitution is founded 
in contract; but the form and time of that contract, no writer has yet attempted 
to discover.
12
  
Wilson’s contention that most governments have been founded on conquest rather than 
contract is a reflection of Hume’s argument in “Of the Original Contract.”13 Indeed, it was 
necessary for Wilson to distance himself from Locke’s social contract theory of 
government to avoid anti-federalist criticism that, under the Articles of Confederation, only 
the state legislatures, acting unanimously, had the authority to alter the existing 
Confederation. To Wilson, the social contract theory was both impractical and antithetical 
to the notion that the authority of government derived from the power of the people: 
This Constitution may be found to have defects in it; hence amendments may 
become necessary; but the idea of a government founded on contract destroys 
the means of improvement. We hear it every time the gentlemen are up, “Shall 
we violate the Confederation, which directs every alteration that is thought 
necessary to be established by the state legislatures only!” Sir, those gentlemen 
must ascend to a higher source: the people fetter themselves by no contract. If 
your state legislatures have cramped themselves by compact, it was done 
without the authority of the people, who alone possess the supreme power.
14
 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention had recognized that, notwithstanding the 
Articles of Confederation, a Constitution purporting to be the act of “We the People,” must 
be ratified by the people in specially called conventions representative of the people of 
each state.  
As James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 49, “the people are the only 
legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under 
which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived . . . .”15 Andrew 
Reck notes that the opening phrase of the Constitution—“We, the People”—establishes the 
founding of government on the consent of the people.
16
 Reck also points out that Hume, in 
rejecting the contractarian theory as a basis for all government, did not exclude “the 
consent of the people from being one just foundation of government.”17 Indeed Wilson 
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viewed the necessity of seeking the consent of the people as superseding any contract 
previously adopted by the state legislatures. Thus, the Constitutional Convention called for, 
and Wilson advocated, ratification of the proposed Constitution by popular conventions 
rather than in accordance with the previously adopted provisions for amending the Articles 
of Confederation. 
Political Factions and an Extended Republic 
According to Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, a basic premise shared by Hume, 
Smith, and Ferguson was that “the behavior of people in society occurs in patterns that are 
more or less uniform in virtually all times and places, and that human nature itself is not 
subject to very great change . . . . State-making and the forming of commonwealths must 
thus be guided by the scientific reading of history’s lessons . . . .”18 Madison’s The 
Federalist No. 10 is viewed as such a scientific reading of Hume’s Essays.19 In the opening 
sentence of No. 10, Madison introduced the proposition that “[a]mong the numerous 
advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately 
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”20 Madison 
observed that there were two methods of removing the causes of faction: “The one by 
destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every 
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”21 Of course, as 
Madison put it, the first cure was worse than the disease and the second was just as 
impracticable.
22
 Thus, Madison concluded that “the causes of faction cannot be removed; 
and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”23 According to 
Madison, by extending the sphere of a republic, “you take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be 
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with 
each other.”24 Madison continued the theme in The Federalist No. 14, where he noted that, 
while a democracy “must be confined to a small spot . . . [a] republic may be extended 
over a large region.”25 
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As Knud Haakonssen puts it: “In their search for principles in the light of which they 
could understand their problems and justify their solutions, the North American colonists 
were particularly receptive to the neo-republican and anti-court ideas of the country 
opposition in the mother country. But among the problems they faced after independence 
was the classical dogma that a republican form of government could exist only in a small 
country.”26 Haakonssen argues that the solution to this problem, as outlined by Madison in 
The Federalist No. 10, was directly inspired by Hume’s speculative “Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth.”27 In particular, Madison seized on Hume’s contention that, contrary to 
Montesquieu’s small-republic theory, a republican government, once established, would 
facilitate the preservation of stability, safe from the effects of faction, in an extensive 
country.
28
 As Forrest McDonald points out, Madison developed Hume’s notion that it was 
possible to minimize the mischievous effects of factions by spreading the republic over a 
large and diverse territory.
29
 
Douglas Adair also recognizes that Madison’s concern about political factions was 
stimulated by Hume’s speculations on the “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth.”30 As Adair 
notes, Hume’s analysis “had turned the small-territory republic theory upside down: if a 
free state could once be established in a large area, if would be stable and safe from the 
effects of faction.”31 Thus, Adair argues that “the germ for Madison’s theory of the 
extended republic” lay in Hume’s Essays.32 
Samuel Fleischacker notes that Madison’s theory for controlling political factions, as 
articulated in Federalist No. 10 was similar to Smith’s idea that a multitude of religious 
sects competing freely with one another would produce greater civil moderation and 
respect than a single sect, or even two or three great sects.
33
 Fleischacker further argues 
that, because “Smith expressed more trust in ordinary people than any of his 
contemporaries . . . Federalists such as Fisher Ames and Alexander Hamilton tended to be 
suspicious of Smith, while Republicans such as [Thomas] Jefferson and John Taylor of 
Caroline were fond of him.”34 According to Gordon Wood, “Madison was willing to allow 
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ordinary people to pursue their partial selfish interests in the expectation that they would be 
so diverse and clashing that they would rarely be able to combine and enter into the 
government as tyrannical majorities.”35 
Mark G. Spencer suggests, however, that it is necessary to read Hume’s political 
essays in conjunction with his History of England.
36
 Spencer notes that, in History of 
England, “extreme factions are criticized, but moderate party affiliation is shown to be 
innocuous and even praiseworthy.”37 According to Spencer, “Hume did not consider all 
factions to be harmful—only extreme ones.”38 Spencer argues that Madison’s definition of 
factions, in The Federalist No. 10—as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community”39—was Humean in the sense that it “denoted only 
parties that were destructive of the wider community.”40 Spencer concludes that Madison, 
like Hume, stressed the dangers of polarization.
41
 And as Spencer observes, Madison was 
worried about the factional polarization that was being propagated under the Articles of 
Confederation.
42
 The answer, Madison believed, was to be found in a large republic. As 
Madison wrote to Jefferson after the Constitutional Convention:  
In a large Society, the people are broken into so many interests and parties, that 
a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the requisite concert less 
likely to be formed, by a majority of the whole.
43
 
In his introductory remarks to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Wilson 
addressed the perceived limitations of an extended republic, citing Montesquieu’s The 
Spirit of Laws.
44
 Wilson acknowledged the conventional wisdom “that the natural property 
of small states is, to be governed as a republic; of middling ones, to be subject to a 
monarch; and of large empires, to be swayed by a despotick prince.”45 As Wilson pointed 
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out, “the United States contain an immense extent of territory,” but the citizens of the 
United States “would reject, with indignation, the fetters of despotism.”46 Thus, arose the 
idea of a confederate republic, which Wilson argued “is peculiarly fitted for the United 
States, the greatest part of whose territory is yet uncultivated.”47 
Political Economy 
As Adair points out, the agrarian theory with which Jefferson and Madison have 
been so closely identified was one of the most common political doctrines of the 
Enlightenment.
48
 According to McDonald, Madison saw an inherent flaw in the idea that 
political economies automatically progressed through various stages (as discussed in 
Chapter 1).
49
 If the vital principle of republics was virtue, then a republic would be 
inherently self-destructive. Madison’s solution was for government to intervene “to arrest 
the evolution of the stages of progress at the commercial agricultural stage, so that 
America might enjoy the refinements but not be subject to corruption.”50 Of course, 
Hamilton, whom McDonald characterizes as the “principal architect of the first national 
system of political economy,” had a different method: “to make it convenient and 
advantageous for all people to conduct their economic activity in ways that would lend 
strength and stability to the national government and to make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to conduct their affairs in detrimental ways.”51 
The popular, if not at times superficial, reliance upon classical philosophers and 
Enlightenment writers continued into the ratification debates. Indeed, Fisher Ames accused 
Madison of adopting “his maxims as he finds them in books, and with too little regard to 
the actual state of things.”52 According to Ames, one of Madison’s first speeches “in regard 
to protecting commerce, was taken out of Smith’s Wealth of Nations. The principles of the 
book are excellent, but the application of them to America requires caution.”53 For his part, 
Ames was “satisfied, and could state some reasons to evince, that commerce and 
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manufactures merit legislative interference in this country, much more than would be 
proper in England.”54 
Nevertheless, Hamilton also turned to Hume’s economic writings for an 
understanding of the incentives that produced economic development.
55
 In The Federalist 
No. 85, Hamilton addressed the additional securities to republican government, to liberty, 
and to property that will be derived from the constitution as a result of “the restraints which 
the preservation of the union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the 
ambition of powerful individuals in single states . . . .”56 In light of these benefits, 
Hamilton urged ratification of the Constitution as “the best which our political situation, 
habits and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced.”57 In 
response to attempts to amend the proposed Constitution prior to its establishment, 
Hamilton relied heavily on Hume: “To balance a large state or society (says he) whether 
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human 
genius, however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect 
it. The judgments of many must unite in the work: EXPERIENCE must guide their labour: 
Time must bring it to perfection: And the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the 
mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first trials and experiments.”58 Because 
seven of the thirteen states had already ratified the proposed Constitution, Hamilton urged 
the other states to move forward with ratification, and seek amendments later to correct the 
“mistakes,” or perhaps omissions, in the original.59 This spirit of compromise, which was 
characteristic of the Enlightenment in America, led to ratification of the Constitution.
60
 
Virtue and Ambition 
In The Federalist No. 51, Madison addressed the need to control the abuses of 
government: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”61 As Hume put it, “[a] constitution is only 
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so far good, as it provides a remedy against mal-administration.”62 Madison argued that the 
greatest security against a concentration of powers in a single department of government 
was “in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional 
means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”63 According to 
Madison, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”64  
Demand for a Declaration of Rights 
The popular debate over virtue and ambition, and the need to control the abuses of 
government, culminated in an intense popular demand for a declaration of rights—an issue 
that had only briefly been addressed, and then dismissed as unnecessary, during the closing 
days of the Constitutional Convention. But the arguments advanced at the Constitutional 
Convention to rebut concerns regarding the omission of a declaration of rights proved to be 
unsatisfactory to the people considering adoption of the proposed Constitution. 
In a letter forwarding a copy of the report of the Convention to Jefferson, John 
Adams noted that the proposed Constitution “seems to be admirably calculated to preserve 
the Union, to increase Affection, and to bring us all to the same mode of thinking,” but he 
expressed concern about the lack of a bill of rights: “What think you of a Declaration of 
Rights? Should not such a Thing have preceded the Model?”65  
At the outset of his State House Yard Speech, Wilson explained that, because the 
delegation of federal powers was based upon a “positive grant, expressed in the instrument 
of union,” the omission of a bill of rights was not a defect in the proposed Constitution.66 
When, on 28 November 1787, Wilson addressed the omission of a bill of rights at the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, he continued to advance the argument that a bill of 
rights was not necessary. According to Wilson, “In a government possessed of enumerated 
powers, such a measure would
 
be not only unnecessary, but preposterous and dangerous . . 
. . [and] highly imprudent.”67 Wilson argued that, because a bill of rights annexed to a 
constitution would be an enumeration of the powers reserved to the people, everything that 
was not enumerated would be presumed to be given to the government.
68
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In a letter to Madison, Jefferson outlined things that he liked about the proposed 
Constitution, followed by things that he did not like: 
First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly & without the aid of 
sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against 
standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal & unremitting force 
of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the 
laws of the land & not by the laws of Nations.
69
  
Madison acknowledged, in The Federalist No. 38, the objection of some to the “want 
of a bill of rights” in the proposed Constitution, but noted that others argued that “a bill of 
rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced.”70 Indeed, Madison asked whether 
a bill of rights was essential to liberty, pointing out that the Articles of Confederation had 
no bill of rights.
71
 
In The Federalist No. 84, Hamilton described the lack of a bill of rights as the “most 
considerable” of the remaining objections to the Constitution.72 Hamilton argued that a bill 
of rights was “not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be 
dangerous.”73 According to Hamilton, a bill of rights “would contain various exceptions to 
powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext 
to claim more than were granted.”74 
On 17 October 1788, Madison advised Jefferson that the states that had adopted the 
Constitution were “all proceeding to the arrangements for putting it into action in March 
next.”75 At the same time, Madison forwarded a pamphlet to Jefferson to give him “a 
collective view of the alterations which have been proposed for the new Constitution.”76 
Although Madison did not view the omission of a bill of rights from the Constitution to be 
a material defect, by this point in time he was in favor of a bill of rights, “provided it be so 
framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration.”77 In response, 
Jefferson “weighed with great satisfaction” Madison’s thoughts “on the subject of the 
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Declaration of right,” but noted: “In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you 
omit one which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of 
the judiciary.”78 
Ratification by New Hampshire—the Ninth State 
Article VII of the Constitution provides: “The Ratification of the Conventions of 
nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States 
so ratifying the Same.”79 On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state to 
ratify the Constitution.
80
 The New Hampshire Ratifying Convention recommended 
amendments to the Constitution and, though it did not condition ratification upon the 
adoption of such amendments, enjoined “it upon their Representatives in Congress, at all 
Times until the alterations and provisions aforesaid have been Considered agreeably to the 
fifth Article of the said Constitution to exert all their Influence & use all reasonable & 
Legal methods to obtain a ratification of the said alterations & Provisions, in such manner 
as is provided in the said article.”81 
Confederation Congress Calls for First National Elections 
On 2 July 1788, the Confederation Congress received notice of the ratification by 
New Hampshire and referred the matter to a committee “to examine the same and report an 
Act to Congress for putting the said constitution into operation in pursuance of the 
resolutions of the late federal Convention.”82 On 8 July 1788, the committee confirmed 
ratification of the Constitution by Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire, and resolved 
that “it is expedient that proceedings do commence thereon as early as may be.”83 Finally, 
on 13 September 1788, Congress passed a resolution establishing a schedule for appointing 
Electors in the several states, for assembling electors in their respective states to vote for a 
president, and for the commencement of proceedings under the Constitution.
84
 The 
establishment of the new national government of the United States will be taken up in the 
next chapter.  
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Virtue and Liberty 
According to Gertrude Himmelfarb, the “usual traits” associated with the 
Enlightenment were “reason, rights, nature, liberty, equality, tolerance, science, [and] 
progress”—with reason at the top of the list.85 For the British, however, “social virtues,” by 
which Himmelfarb means compassion, benevolence, and sympathy, took precedence over 
reason.
86
 While, in Britain, social virtues were in the forefront; in America, Himmelfarb 
says, “they were in the background, the necessary but not sufficient condition.”87 
Himmelfarb further contends that, in America, the driving force was not reason but 
political liberty.
88
 As Himmelfarb puts it, “reason was an instrument for the attainment of 
the larger social end, not the end itself.”89 Himmelfarb argues that the relationship between 
social virtue and political liberty “was at the heart of the quarrel between the Federalists 
and the Anti-Federalists.”90 According to Himmelfarb, “Virtue was the principal concern 
of the Anti-Federalists, and corruption (the kind they saw in England) was their principle 
worry.”91 Himmelfarb contends that the Federalists sought a surrogate for public virtue in 
the political institutions that fostered a multiplicity and diversity of interests, and they 
found it in the separation of powers and checks and balances.
92
 Nevertheless, Federalists 
assumed that virtue and wisdom would be found in the representatives of the people who 
were virtuous and wise enough to choose them.
93
 Of course, the Federalists prevailed in 
achieving ratification of the Constitution, but the Anti-Federalists also secured the promise 
of a declaration of rights to further protect citizens from potential corruption of the new 
national government. Perhaps the greatest test of the civic virtue of the representatives 
chosen by the people to represent them in the First Congress of the United States was 
whether they would be able to fulfill that promise by proposing, as amendments to the 
Constitution, a declaration or bill of rights. The Bill of Rights will be taken up, along with 
the establishment of the new government, in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The Constitution Established 
Early Days of the Republic 
Formation of the Government 
The House of Representatives convened on Wednesday, 4 March 1789, at the city of 
New York—“pursuant to a resolution of the late Congress”—but, in the absence of a 
quorum, adjourned from day to day until a quorum was first present on 1 April 1789.
1
 
Likewise, the Senate convened on 4 March 1789, but a quorum did not arrive in that 
chamber until 6 April 1789.
2
 
One of the first orders of business before the Congress was to count the votes of the 
Electors for President and Vice President of the United States. The Senate and House of 
Representatives met in joint session on 6 April 1789, and declared that George Washington 
was unanimously elected President and that John Adams was duly elected Vice President.
3
 
On 24 September 1789, President Washington signed “An Act to establish the 
Judicial Courts of the United States,” and nominated John Jay of New York as Chief 
Justice of the United States, together with five associate justices, who were all confirmed 
by the Senate two days later.
4
 The first session of the Supreme Court was scheduled to 
commence on the first Monday of February 1790, but in the absence of a quorum on 1 
February 1790, the Court adjourned and opened on the following day—2 February 1790—
with Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices William Cushing, James Wilson, and 
John Blair in attendance.
5
 
Adoption of the Bill of Rights 
On the motion of James Madison, the House of Representatives, on 4 May 1789, 
ordered that the fourth Monday in May be assigned for “the consideration of the exercise 
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of the powers vested in Congress by the 5th article of the constitution, relative to 
amendments.”6 After a short delay to permit Congress to tend to the pressing business of 
organizing a government, on 8 June 1789, Madison presented a resolution proposing 
various amendments to the Constitution, which was, after a lengthy discussion, referred to 
a committee of the whole on the state of the union.
7
 
On 30 June 1789, Madison forwarded to Thomas Jefferson in Paris a copy of the 
Sundry Amendments to the Constitution which Madison had presented to the House of 
Representatives on 8 June 1789.
8
 Jefferson responded, “I like it as far as it goes; but I 
should have been for going further.”9  
On 12 July 1789, Madison’s resolution was referred to a select committee consisting 
of one member from each state, with instructions that the committee would not be bound 
by the amendments proposed by some of the adopting states.
10
 The House finally went into 
a committee of the whole on 13 August 1789, to take up the select committee report.
11
 The 
proposed amendments were debated by the House from 13 August until 24 August, when a 
resolution of amendments was agreed to and referred to the Senate.
12
 After the Senate 
proposed further amendments to the House resolution, the matter was referred to a 
conference committee, and both houses finally agreed to the conference committee report 
on 24 September 1789.
13
 
Thus, on 28 September 1789, the First Congress of the United States proposed 
twelve amendments to the Constitution, noting that the conventions of a number of the 
states, at the time of their adopting the Constitution, had “expressed a desire, in order to 
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prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive 
clauses should be added.”14 
When, in 1791, Virginia became the eleventh state to ratify articles III through XII of 
the proposed “articles in addition to, and amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America,” what came to be known as the Bill of Rights became part of the 
Constitution.
15
 
Impact of Scottish Enlightenment on Separation of Powers  
In a letter to his cousin, Samuel Adams, Vice President John Adams expressed a 
desire for developing political institutions which would make up for the lack of knowledge 
and society “sufficiently general for the security of society.”16 John Adams further noted: 
“I am not often satisfied with the opinions of Hume; but in this he seems well founded, that 
all projects of government, founded in the supposition or expectation of extraordinary 
degrees of virtue, are evidently chimerical.”17 
Vice President Adams, in revealing his skepticism of human nature, also argued that 
they must guard against use of the term republican, in referring to a form of government, 
to mean anything other than “a government in which the people have collectively, or by 
representation, an essential share in the sovereignty,” and which consists of “a mixture of 
three powers, forming a mutual balance.”18 In response, Samuel Adams argued that the 
whole sovereignty is in the people and that the “American legislatures are nicely 
balanced,” with each branch having a check on the other, which together are balanced by a 
third power—the veto power of the chief executive.19 Responding more generally to John 
Adams’ skepticism, Samuel Adams contends that, “without knowledge and benevolence, 
men would neither have been capable nor disposed to search for the principles or form the 
system” of good government.20 According to Samuel Adams, “Mr. Hume may call this a 
‘chimerical project, [but] I am far from thinking the people can be deceived, by urging 
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upon them a dependence on the more general prevalence of knowledge and virtue.”21 Thus, 
the philosophical debates among the most enlightened minds of Scotland were taken up by 
leaders of the new republic in America. 
In July 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson made a request of the first Chief 
Justice of the United States at the behest of President Washington. As a result of the war 
among European powers, there arose questions of “considerable difficulty, and of greater 
importance to the peace of the United States” that “depend for their solution on the 
construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land,” 
but which “are often presented under circumstances which do not give a cognisance of 
them to the tribunals of the country.”22 According to Jefferson, President Washington 
wanted to know if he might “refer questions of this description to the opinions of the 
judges of the Supreme Court of the United States.”23 After Chief Justice John Jay and the 
Associate Justices had an opportunity to consider the question regarding “the lines of 
separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government,” 
Jay responded: 
These being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of 
a court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments 
against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to, 
especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on 
the heads of departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as 
expressly united to the executive department.
24
 
Thus, notwithstanding Washington’s own experience presiding over the Constitutional 
Convention, which had laid out the structure of government and the powers of its 
respective branches, it took an international crisis to test the bounds of each branch’s 
authority. 
In addition to President Washington, twenty-one members of the First Congress and 
three of the six members of the first Supreme Court had also served as delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention. But it is the work of Associate Justice James Wilson, the 
Scottish-born lawyer who spoke frequently at both the Constitutional Convention and the 
Philadelphia Ratifying Convention, which provides the most insight into how the Scottish 
Enlightenment shaped the establishment of the constitutional republic. In addition to his 
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contribution to constitutional jurisprudence in the few cases that came before the Supreme 
Court during his eight-year tenure as Associate Justice, Wilson attempted to codify 
American jurisprudence in his Lectures on Law.  
May notes that Wilson “devoted considerable time in his famous lectures on the law 
to praising the principles of Reid, and contrasting them to those of Blackstone and even 
Locke. In the republic, he insisted, the law must be grounded not in custom or tradition but 
in moral obligation, understood through the method of Common Sense.”25 Mark David 
Hall points out that Wilson is quoting Reid’s Intellectual Powers, in writing: “The Author 
of our existence intended us to be social beings; and has, for that end, given us social 
intellectual powers.”26 And Geoffrey Seed also noted that Reid’s common sense 
philosophy was directly relevant to Wilson’s view of government.27 Wilson’s Lectures on 
Law
28
 provide a useful outline for a discussion of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government set out in the next three sections of this chapter. Perhaps the most 
significant contribution Wilson made to the structure of government was the notion that the 
principle of representation was not confined to the lower house of the legislature—as in the 
House of Commons, but were diffused “through all the constituent parts of government.”29 
Article I — A Bicameral Legislature 
In his lecture on the legislative department, Wilson noted that the constitutional 
principle of representation of the people “draws along with it” the principle of free and 
equal elections.
30
 According to Wilson, “[t]o vote for members of a legislature, is to 
perform an act of original sovereignty.”31 Wilson argued that every citizen whose 
circumstances did not render him necessarily dependent on the will of another should 
possess the right to vote for his representative.
32
 Furthermore, Wilson said that, though the 
supreme power of the state resided in the people, it would be unwise to infer, by the 
people’s delegation of the choice of senators to the state legislatures, that either the dignity 
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or the importance of the Senate was inferior to the dignity or the importance of the House 
of Representatives.
33
 
Garry Wills notes that, at the Constitutional Convention at least, Madison “was an 
advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations” as 
proposed by Hume.
34
 By contrast, Shannon C. Stimson contends that Wilson was a 
revolutionary advocate of “supreme, absolute and uncontrollable” sovereignty residing in 
the people.
35
 According to Stimson, Wilson’s “consistent support at the Constitutional 
Convention for proportional representation and the direct election of the president and the 
members of the national House and Senate, certainly outstripped the popular impulse of 
Madison.”36    
Wilson noted that when citizens fulfill their duty of researching, investigating, and 
discussing with candor concerning the manners and characters of proper persons to 
represent them, likely candidates would be improved and impassioned by the “hope of 
becoming the object of well founded and distinguishing applause.”37  
Wilson reflected on the need to check human passions as justifying a bicameral 
legislature: “If one of them should depart, or attempt to depart from the principles of the 
constitution; it will be drawn back by the other.”38 Indeed, Wilson suggested that “[t]he 
very apprehension of the event will prevent the departure or the attempt.”39 In addition, 
Wilson applauded the “double source of information, precision, and sagacity in planning, 
digesting, composing, comparing, and finishing the laws, both in form and substance” 
afforded by a bicameral legislature.
40
  
Wilson cited to Millar’s An Historical View of the English Constitution as 
background to his explanation of “much concerning the laws, and rules, and powers of the 
two houses of the congress of the United States,” including the historical reason for 
assigning the power of trying impeachments to the upper house, while the power of 
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conducting the prosecution should belong to the lower house.
41
 Furthermore, both in 
pointing out that, under Article I, all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives, and in suggesting that, over time, each of the two houses would develop 
their own unique characteristics, Wilson cited Millar’s observations regarding the two 
houses of Parliament: “each of them came to be possessed of certain peculiar privileges; 
which, although probably the object of little attention in the beginning, have since risen to 
great political importance.”42 
Wilson also cited Millar’s An Historical View to highlight a British practice that the 
Framers sought to avoid in Article I. Rather than the sole right of convening, adjourning, 
and dissolving Parliament being vested in the crown, in the United States the legislature 
“has a right to sit upon its own adjournments.”43 The President, as Hamilton pointed out in 
The Federalist No. 69, can only adjourn the national legislature in the single case of 
disagreement about the time of adjournment.
44
 In addition, the power of declaring war, and 
the other powers naturally connected with it, were vested in the Congress, whereas, at that 
time, the king had the sole power of making war in Great Britain. According to Wilson, the 
Constitution of the United States renewed a principle of government, as they were told by 
Millar—“a well informed writer”—followed by the Anglo-Saxon government before the 
Conquest, in which the power of making peace and war was “invariably possessed by the 
wittenagemote.”45  
Article II — A Unified Executive 
Wilson noted that the executive branch of government, as well as the legislative 
power, ought to be restrained.
46
 But unlike the legislative branch, which must be divided to 
be restrained, “the executive power, in order to be restrained, should be one.”47 As Wilson 
put it, because the restraints on the executive power were necessarily external, they would 
be applied “with greatest certainty, and with greatest efficacy, when the object of restraint 
is clearly ascertained,” which is best done when one distinguished and responsible person 
“is conspicuously held up to the view and examination of the publick.”48 
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With no precedent in the British constitution for an elected chief executive officer, it 
is not surprising that Wilson had less to say about the office of the President, and made no 
references to writers of the Scottish Enlightenment with respect to the executive branch. 
Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution names the President as Commander and 
Chief of the armed forces.
49
 Samuel Fleischacker credits Smith’s statement in Wealth of 
Nations—that a standing army was dangerous to liberty “wherever the interest of the 
general and that of the principal officers are not necessarily connected with the support of 
the constitution of the state”50—as influencing this constitutional provision designed, 
Fleischacker says, to tie the material interests of the general to the state.
51
 
Article III — An Independent Judiciary 
Wilson cited Hume’s Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects in promoting the 
independence of the judiciary: “As all controversies respecting life, liberty, reputation, and 
property, must be influenced by their judgments; and as their judgments ought to be 
calculated not only to do justice, but also to give general satisfaction . . . they ought to be 
placed in such a situation, as not only to be, but likewise to appear superiour to every 
extrinsick circumstance, which can be supposed to have the smallest operation upon their 
understandings or their inclinations.”52  
Article III, section 2, extended the judicial power of the United States to specific 
classifications of cases “in Law and Equity.”53 Wilson pointed to Lord Bacon as preferring 
that jurisdiction of law and equity be divided, while Lord Kames thought they should be 
united—attributing this natural distinction to their own respective judicial experiences.54 
Both Bacon and Kames agreed, however, that the boundary between equity and common 
law be clearly ascertained.
55
 
Alexander Hamilton discussed the judiciary department in The Federalist No. 78, 
dated 28 May 1788.
56
 According to Hamilton, “the judiciary, from the nature of its 
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; 
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because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”57 Indeed, Hamilton cited 
Montesquieu in stating that “the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three 
departments of power.”58 Hamilton noted that the authority of the courts to pronounce 
legislative acts void, because they are contrary to the constitution, does not suppose a 
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power; but only that the power of the people is 
superior to both.
59
 Nevertheless, Hamilton argued that the independence of judges was 
necessary “to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those 
ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, 
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily 
give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency in the 
mean time to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions 
of the minor party in the community.”60 
Likewise, Wilson advocated the power of judicial review, which he described as a 
“noble guard against legislative despotism!”61 According to Wilson, “[i]t does not confer 
upon the judicial department a power superiour, in its general nature, to that of the 
legislature; but it confers upon it, in particular instances, and for particular purposes, the 
power of declaring and enforcing the superiour power of the constitution—the supreme 
law of the land.”62 
From the earliest days, the Court took a firm position on the separation of powers. In 
Hayburn’s Case, Edmond Randolph, the first Attorney General of the United States, 
sought a writ of mandamus commanding the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania 
to proceed in a petition of William Hayburn, who had applied to be put on the pension list 
of the United States as an invalid pensioner.
63
 The Invalid Petitioners Act, passed by 
Congress on 23 March 1792, charged circuit judges with the task of hearing claims of 
veterans injured in the Revolutionary War to determine their eligibility for benefits under 
the Act. On 18 April 1792, the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, consisting of 
Justices James Wilson and John Blair, along with District Judge Richard Peters, wrote a 
letter to President Washington outlining the constitutional provisions establishing the 
separation of powers doctrine and noted: “It is a principle important to freedom that in 
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government, the judicial should be distinct from and independent of the legislative 
department.”64 Regarding the Act to regulate the claims to invalid pensions, the 
Pennsylvania Circuit Court concluded: “Upon due consideration, we have been 
unanimously of opinion that under this act, the circuit court held for the Pennsylvania 
District could not proceed” because “the business directed by this act is not of a judicial 
nature” and, if the court had proceeded, its judgments might, under the same act, “have 
been revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive 
department.”65 Likewise, the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, consisting of 
Justice James Iredell and District Judge John Sitgreaves, made similar observations in a 
letter to President Washington on 8 June 1792.
66
 The Circuit Court for the District of New 
York, consisting of Chief Justice John Jay, Justice William Cushing, and District Judge 
James Duane, also concluded that the duties assigned to the circuit courts were not 
properly judicial, but were of the opinion that “the act can only be considered as appointing 
commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official instead of personal 
descriptions”—in other words, the judges of the court would adjourn the court and proceed 
in the capacity of commissioners to avoid an infringement on the separation of powers.
67
 
Before the full Supreme Court could act on Attorney General Randolph’s application for 
writ of mandamus, Congress amended the Act and the case became moot.  Madison 
commented on the circuit court opinion by noting that “[t]he judges have also called the 
attention of the [Public] to Legislative fallibility, by pronouncing a law providing for 
Invalid Pensioners, unconstitutional & void.”68 
In Chisholm v. Georgia, the first significant Supreme Court decision, Associate 
Justice Wilson posed the question before the Court as: whether the State of Georgia, 
claiming to be sovereign, “is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”69 Wilson argued that this question “may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved 
into one, no less radical than this ‘do the people of the United States form a Nation.’”70 
Wilson first examined principles of general jurisprudence, an inquiry that began with a 
quote from Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common 
Sense: “. . . It is hardly possible to make any innovation in our philosophy concerning the 
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mind and its operations, without using new words or phrases, or giving a different meaning 
to those that are received.”71 Although the term sovereign was, as Wilson put it, totally 
unknown in the Constitution of the United States, there was, according to Wilson, only one 
place in the Constitution where the term could have been used with propriety—the people 
could have announced themselves in the Preamble as the “Sovereign” People of the United 
States.
72
 Indeed, Wilson, who disapproved the purposes for which the terms sovereign and 
state were frequently used, defined state, as “a complete body of free persons united 
together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice 
to others.”73 According to Wilson, a state was an artificial person—distinct from, yet 
subordinate to its people—that may acquire property, incur debts, and be bound by 
contracts.
74
 Thus, Wilson concluded that a dishonest state, like a dishonest merchant, 
which willfully refused to discharge its contracts, was amenable to a Court of Justice.
75
 
Wilson’s conclusion that the sovereign “must be found in the man” was based upon the 
principle that “laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded 
on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require.”76 Because the citizens of 
Georgia, “when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as part of the ‘People of the 
United States,’” consented to the judicial power of the United States being vested in the 
Supreme Court, Wilson did not find anything in the principles of jurisprudence that 
evidenced “an exemption of the State of Georgia, from the jurisdiction on the Court.”77 
Based upon the explicit declaration of the Constitution itself, Wilson held that the State of 
Georgia was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which extended to  
controversies between a state and citizens of another State—even when the state was 
named as a defendant.
78
 In finding that sovereignty derives from the consent of the people, 
Wilson, like Chief Justice Jay, rejected the feudal system, which considered the Prince as 
the sovereign.
79
   
According to Robin Paul Malloy, who conducted an exhaustive survey of federal 
court references to Adam Smith, “[i]n the early years of the Constitution and just following 
the Civil War, the federal courts were concerned with a number of issues, but the ones that 
made the strongest references to Smith were regarding the proper interpretation of the 
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government's power to tax.”80 Indeed, in Hylton v. United States—the first case 
challenging the constitutionality of an act of Congress to come before the Supreme 
Court—Associate Justice William Paterson quoted Adam Smith’s distinction, in Wealth of 
Nations, between a direct tax on revenue and an indirect tax on expenses by taxing 
consumable commodities upon which such expense is incurred.
81
 Paterson ruled, along 
with the majority of the Court, that a tax on carriages was an indirect tax on expenses or 
consumption and, thus, did not violate the constitutional provision restricting direct taxes 
to those laid in proportion to the census.
82
 
In a recent article entitled, “Article III and the Scottish Courts,” James Pfander and 
Daniel Birk argue that the legal system of Scotland provided an important—yet previously 
overlooked—“model for the creation of Article III’s one Supreme Court, with jurisdiction 
in law, equity, and admiralty, protection from legislative control, and a hierarchical 
superiority over inferior courts.”83 Pfander and Birk point out that Scottish legal writers, 
including Lord Kames, emphasized “the importance of the supremacy of the Court of 
Session, its power to supervise and correct the decisions of inferior tribunals, and the 
hierarchical relationship between the supreme court and subordinate courts.”84 In addition, 
they point to a similarity of language between Article III of the U.S. Constitution and 
Article 19 of the Acts of Union of 1707, particularly with respect to “their use of 
supremacy, inferiority, and qualified legislative power to secure a hierarchical judicial 
system.”85 Pfander and Birk further note: 
Just as Articles I and III allow Congress to ordain, establish, and constitute 
only courts and tribunals that remain inferior to the one Supreme Court, so too 
do the Acts of Union specify that inferior courts must remain “Subordinate” to 
the Scottish supreme court. Just as Article III contemplates finality, so too do 
the Acts of Union foreclose judicial review of the decisions of the Court of 
Session.
86
 
While acknowledging the inherent difficulty in attributing specific constitutional principles 
to Scottish influence, Pfander and Birk do find it significant that “the Exceptions and 
Regulations Clause first appeared in an August 1787 Committee of Detail draft written by 
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the Scottish-born James Wilson.”87 As Pfander and Birk further point out, “In the 
Introduction to his widely read Principles of Equity, Kames made an extensive case for the 
unitary model of his own court.”88 In addition, Kames’ Historical Law-Tracts “provided 
the most complete exposition of the correlative relationship of supreme and inferior courts 
available at the time of the Framing.”89 According to Pfander and Birk, the Court of 
Session exercised supervisory authority—to protect the hierarchical relationship of the 
judiciary specified in the Acts of Union—in many situations in which parliament had 
restricted the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Session.
90
 In light of the Framers’ 
familiarity with the Scottish model of a unitary judicial system, which was quite different 
from the English model of multiplicity, Pfander and Birk offer a view of the Exceptions 
and Regulations Clause that might otherwise have been forgotten to history: 
Just as the Acts of Union protected the privileges and authority of the Court of 
Session from parliamentary remodeling, so too did Article III secure the 
judicial power and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Just as the Acts of Union 
contemplated that Parliament would make routine housekeeping regulations, so 
too did Article III authorize exceptions and regulations to the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction to provide for the more convenient administration of justice. Just as 
the Session’s power to supervise inferior courts was understood to survive any 
parliamentary restrictions on its appellate jurisdiction, so too does the Supreme 
Court’s spot-checking supervisory authority necessarily survive any 
congressional exceptions to its as of right appellate jurisdiction.
91
 
Virtue as an Inadequate Protector of Liberty 
When virtue alone was found by the people to be an inadequate assurance that 
individual liberties would be protected in the new republic, several of the state ratifying 
conventions demanded the adoption of a bill of rights. As noted above, ten amendments 
proposed by the First Congress became part of the Constitution upon ratification by the 
State of Virginia in December 1791. Because a review of all ten amendments would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the first two are briefly examined against the backdrop of 
the Scottish Enlightenment.  
First Amendment — First Freedoms 
Francis Hutcheson presented an early form of religious toleration in his System of 
Moral Philosophy. For Hutcheson, the magistrate retained an important role in providing 
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“proper instruction for all, especially for young minds, about the existence, goodness, and 
providence of God, and all the social duties of life, and the motives to them.”92 
Nevertheless, Hutcheson taught that “[e]very rational creature has a right to judge for itself 
in these matters; and as men must assent according to the evidence that appears to them, 
and cannot command their own assent in opposition to it, this right is plainly unalienable; it 
cannot be matter of contract; nor can there be any right of compulsion as to opinions, 
conveyed to or vested in any magistrate.”93 Likewise, Hutcheson advocated a limited 
freedom of expression: “the magistrate can have no right to punish any for publishing their 
sentiments, how false soever he may think them, if they are not hurtful to society.”94 Here 
it should be noted that Hutcheson viewed atheism and the teaching of “principles directly 
immoral” to be hurtful to society, and, thus, punishable by the magistrate.95 
In his essay, “Of the Liberty of the Press,” David Hume observed in 1741, “Nothing 
is more apt to surprise a foreigner than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this country, 
of communicating whatever we please to the public, and of openly censuring every 
measure, entered into by the king or his ministers.”96 According to Hume, “[t]he spirit of 
the people must frequently be rouzed, in order to curb the ambition of the court; and the 
dread of rousing this spirit must be employed to prevent that ambition.”97 Hume viewed 
freedom of the press as being of importance to the preservation of a republican form of 
government.
98
 
Adam Smith expressed his views of religious liberty in practical terms:  
In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more 
than those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have 
any particular or immediate dependency upon the sovereign or executive 
power; or that he should have any thing to do, either in appointing, or in 
dismissing them from their offices. In such a situation he would have no 
occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep the 
peace among them, in the same manner as among the rest of his subjects; that 
is, to hinder them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another.
99
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Second Amendment — Right to Keep and Bear Arms 
Adam Ferguson described as a “fatal refinement” the policy of civilized and 
commercial nations to sometimes form a distinction between civil and military 
professions.
100
 Ferguson observed that “[w]hen a people is accustomed to arms, it is 
difficult for a part to subdue the whole,” but that, with the establishment of disciplined 
armies, it was no longer difficult for a usurper to govern the many by the help of a few.
101
 
Ferguson further argued that “[a] people who are disarmed in compliance with this fatal 
refinement, have rested their safety on the pleadings of reason and of justice at the tribunal 
of ambition and of force. In such an extremity laws are quoted, and senators are assembled 
in vain.”102 
According to Richard B. Sher, whereas Adam Smith promoted the positive aspects of 
the division of labor and economic growth generally, Ferguson’s focus was on the dangers 
posed by the division of labor.
103
 While civic humanist tradition demanded militias rather 
than standing armies, Sher suggests that, “because militias were considered necessary for 
reinforcing and protecting liberty,” advocates of militias during the Scottish Enlightenment 
“subtly moved the focus of the debate from constitutional liberty to civic virtue.”104 Thus, 
Sher argues, one contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment was “to situate the problem of 
national defense within the wider framework of political economy and moral 
philosophy.”105 After the British militia act of 1757 deliberately excluded Scotland, 
Ferguson became a prominent spokesman for an unsuccessful campaign, during 1759-60 
and in 1762, to enact a Scots militia bill in Parliament.
106
 
Sher further points to Ferguson’s notes of his Edinburgh lectures on moral 
philosophy, dated 9 April 1776, regarding the advantages offered by nonprofessionals 
defending their homeland: 
The Husbandman, the Labourer, and the Country Gentleman may in the 
use of arms and discipline be inferior to the Professional Soldier. But there is 
no reason why he should be inferior to what a Citizen may be made. He has the 
advantage of Affection and Principle over the Mercenary Soldier.
107
 
                                                 
100
 Ferguson, History of Civil Society, 452. 
101
 Ibid. 
102
 Ibid. 
103
 Richard B. Sher, “Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the Problem of National Defense,” The 
Journal of Modern History 61, no. 2 (1989): 242. 
104
 Ibid., 242-43. 
105
 Ibid., 243. 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Ibid., 256. 
Chapter 5 69 
 
Ferguson’s yearning, as Sher puts it, “for the classical ideal of the independent 
citizen who demonstrates his patriotism and civic virtue by bearing arms,”108 is reflected in 
the Second Amendment: “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”109 
Scottish Enlightenment Ideas Reflected in the New Republic  
Gordon Wood observed that “[b]oth Americans and Scots were provincial peoples 
living on the edges of the metropolitan English world.”110 As Wood put it: 
Both the Scots and the North Americans were acutely aware of the 
contrast between civilization and the nearby barbarism of the Highland clans 
and the North American Indian tribes. Both were keenly aware too of the 
degrees of civilization and spent much time writing and reading essays on the 
stages of social progress from rudeness to refinement. They knew that they 
lived in cruder and more simple societies than the English and that England 
was well along in the fourth and final stage of social development—
commercial society—and had much to offer them in the ways of politeness and 
refinement.
111
 
At the same time, Woods notes, “both the Scots and Americans knew only too well that the 
polite and sophisticated metropolitan center of the empire was steeped in luxury and 
corruption.”112  
John Clive and Bernard Bailyn contend that the “similarities in social origins 
between the Scottish and American literati” were attributable, not only to trade, migration, 
and cultural exchanges, but by “the profound fact that Scotland and America were 
provinces, cultural as well as political and economic, of the English-speaking world whose 
center was London.”113 Clive and Bailyn argue that, although a “sense of inferiority 
pervaded the culture of the two regions,” the “complexity of the provincial’s image of the 
world and of himself made demands upon him unlike those felt by the equivalent 
Englishmen.”114 Thus, Clive and Bailyn conclude that this shared provincialism “may help 
us to understand the conditions which fostered in such men the originality and creative 
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imagination that we associate with the highest achievements of the Enlightenment in 
Scotland and America.”115 
In an effort to identify a specifically Scottish contribution to America, Andrew Hook 
examines the eighteenth century cultural parallels between Philadelphia and Edinburgh.
116
 
Hook describes both Philadelphia and Edinburgh as provincial cities that “aimed to create 
a society that was modern and progressive, at least in the eyes of significant sections of 
their controlling élites, rather than provincial and backward—a society that might in the 
end command the approval, rather than the disdain, of the metropolitan capital that 
remained the standard of a mature and civilised culture.”117 According to Hook, the pattern 
in both cities was for the same range of individuals to be involved in a variety of 
intellectual and cultural activities, as evidenced by the prevalence of clubs, societies, and 
institutions that promoted the advancement of “the kinds of progressive change that signal 
the spread of Enlightenment values.”118 Hook notes that these clubs and societies, in both 
Philadelphia and Edinburgh, rather than pursuing knowledge for its own sake, placed “a 
strong emphasis on the practical, social benefits of progress and improvement.”119 Against 
this backdrop, Hook poses the question: “why should Philadelphians have been open to 
influence from the Scottish dimension of the European Enlightenment?”120 Hook 
acknowledges the Clive and Bailyn thesis discussed above, but argues that a shared sense 
of “cultural provincialism” could only have been a single dimension of the factors that 
“ensured a Philadelphian interest in Scottish cultural progress.”121 Hook contends that the 
most relevant factors were the influence of Scottish educators who were present in 
Philadelphia and the number of Philadelphians travelling to Scotland for education.
122
 
Hook concludes that a precise assessment of “Philadelphia’s overall debt to Scottish 
intellectual life” cannot be achieved.123 But Hook does suggest that the pattern of education 
in Philadelphia revealed that Philadelphians “continued to be attracted to the most 
powerful, modern and progressive, but broadly conservative ideology available, that of the 
Scottish Enlightenment in its post-Humean, common sense phase.”124 
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One of those Scottish educators in Philadelphia, James Wilson, was an advocate of 
Reid’s common sense philosophy. Shannon Stimson contends that “[a]ll the democratic 
elements implicit in Reid’s common sense epistemology and moral sense judgement are 
explicitly developed in Wilson’s work, particularly in his Lectures on Law.”125 According 
to Stimson:  
Four Reidian elements are central to Wilson’s democratic thought: (1) 
the rejection of skepticism; (2) the preference for an ordinary language 
conflation of sense, judgement and reason; (3) the interaction of feeling and 
intellect in judgement; (4) the social resolution of the problems of error.
126
 
As Stimson concludes, Wilson’s “common sense epistemology underpins an argument for 
the widest possible implementation of popular sovereignty in the form of constitutional 
government, direct and actual representation, widespread suffrage and majority rule by the 
‘people.’”127 For Wilson, absolute sovereignty resided in the people, which made the 
American constitution “materially different” from that of the British.128 Thus, in the best 
tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment, Wilson was able to adapt a philosophical principle 
imported from the Scottish Enlightenment and apply it in the development of the uniquely 
American doctrine of popular sovereignty. 
Stephen A. Conrad argues that Wilson developed, in his Lectures on Law, an 
argument implying that it was the politeness of the general citizenry, and not the 
exceptional talent, virtue, or knowledge of public leaders, that “would be the social materia 
of the democratic republic that Wilson envisioned.”129 According to Conrad, Wilson saw 
two principal threats to the fortunes of republicanism: one from “the orthodox legal theory 
predicated on the ‘despotick’ conception of law as ‘a command from superior to 
inferiour’”; and the other from “the fashionable ‘metaphysicks’ of the day that seemed to 
indicate a skeptical denial of the possibility of knowledge itself.”130 Wilson challenged 
William Blackstone as the “leading advocate of this ‘despotick’ theory of law, and 
therefore as the chief enemy of the legitimate ‘science of government.’”131 With regard to 
“metaphysicks,” Wilson singled out “the clever skeptic David Hume . . . as the most 
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insidious enemy of ‘all . . . sound philosophy.’”132 On the other hand, Wilson warmly 
embraced the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense, “and extolled Reid above all other 
modern philosophers.”133 In particular, Wilson turned to “common sense” principles as 
taking precedence over “conclusions of nicely reasoned logic.”134 Significantly, Conrad 
notes, Wilson believed “in the ability of the moral sense to reconcile the operations of 
man’s will with those of his understanding, and especially with man’s ultimate judgments 
on common matters of fundamental importance.”135 According to Conrad, Wilson 
concluded that “in any well-contrived republic where the citizens cultivated the 
enlightening and socializing routines of politeness, there would be good reason to expect 
the development of both a genuine community of ‘uniform interest’ and a sound 
community of ‘deliberate’ wills, with both based on a fundamental community of 
‘discursive knowledge.’”136 
 One area in which the community of the new republic had a common interest was 
in the improvement of agricultural techniques. Roy Branson points to James Madison’s 
address before the Agricultural Society of Albemarle, Virginia, as an example of 
Madison’s tendency to employ both the concepts and terminology of key thinkers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.
137
 Madison invoked Adam Smith and John Millar in his summary 
of the four stages theory of societal development: “the hunter becoming the herdsman; the 
latter a follower of the plough; and the last repairing to the manufactory or the 
workshop.”138 Branson further notes that, in the same address, “Madison went on to 
articulate [Adam] Ferguson’s concern at society’s devolution, even incorporating his term 
‘savage’ into the discussion.”139 Even in the United States, Madison feared, the “bent of 
human nature” was such that the “manufacturer readily exchanges the loom for the plough, 
in opposition often, to his own interest, as well as to that of his country.”140 In the midst of 
Madison’s extensive discussion of population, prosperity, and the need to improve 
agricultural practices, Madison noted that the “enviable condition of the people of the 
United States” was due, in no small part, “to the fertile activity of a free people, and the 
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benign influence of a responsible government.”141 Branson concludes that “Madison’s 
particular achievement was that as he refined forms of the United States government he 
recognized the importance of the non-governmental parts of the nation.”142 According to 
Branson, “Madison was able to synthesize the Lockean rationalistic understanding of 
contractual majorities dominating governmental action with the Scottish historical-
developmental view of society full of active occupational, political, and commercial 
groups achieving moderate reforms.”143 Following the Scottish example of societies for 
progress and improvement, Madison promoted patriotic societies such as the Agricultural 
Society of Albemarle as “the best agents for effecting” agricultural reform among a self-
governed people.
144
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Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
Some have suggested that the exchange of ideas between Scotland and America 
came to an abrupt halt with the beginning of the American Revolution.
1
 Even if trade and 
transportation with Great Britain were temporarily interrupted during the war, the free flow 
of ideas inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment continued among the American states. 
Moreover, Hook contends that the Scottish contribution to the Enlightenment in America 
was larger and became more enduring in the period after independence.
2
  
On 20 March 1794 (New York), Chief Justice Jay wrote to Dugald Steward, 
Professor of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh, thanking him for “the ingenious work which 
you were so obliging as to send me.”3 Chief Justice Jay went on to say: 
It is much to be wished that nothing may occur to prevent your finishing the 
analysis of the intellectual powers, and extending your speculations to man 
considered as an active and moral being, and as the member of a political 
society. There is reason to doubt whether this field of science has, as yet, 
received the highest cultivation of which it is capable. The republic of letters is 
under many obligations to your country. May those obligations be increased.
4
  
And indeed, the transcendent ideas of the key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment would 
continue to permeate American philosophical discourse well into the nineteenth century. 
For example, Robin Paul Malloy suggests that “Adam Smith is no longer just a man who 
wrote a very important set of books, he is a transcendent idea, and this idea is central to 
ongoing debates concerning the proper relationship among individuals, the community, 
and the state.”5  
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine how the Scottish Enlightenment 
influenced the drafting of the United States Constitution and the establishment of a 
constitutional republic. This examination has revealed a very definite, though certainly not 
exclusive, Scottish influence. In 1790, Thomas Jefferson commended Thomas Mann 
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Randolph, Jr. in his decision to “apply to the study of law” as “the most certain stepping 
stone to preferment in the political line.”6 Jefferson recommended, Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations as the “best book extant . . . [i]n political oeconomy.”7 Jefferson suggested that, in 
the science of government, Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws “is generally recommended,” but 
also advised Randolph that it “contains indeed a great number of political truths; but 
almost an equal number of political heresies.”8 Jefferson also noted that “Locke’s little 
book on government is perfect as far as it goes” and that “[s]everal of Hume’s political 
essays are good also.”9 Like the other Founders, Jefferson took the best ideas of Locke as 
well as Hume, of Montesquieu as well as Smith.  
Gertrude Himmelfarb notes that Locke’s assertion of the natural inequality of man 
“stands in dramatic contrast to the pronouncements of Smith and Hume, who made a point 
of minimizing the natural differences, and thus the natural inequality, of men.”10 Yet, 
suggests Himmelfarb, “[t]he conflation of Lockean and Scottish views, as if they were 
entirely compatible, was so common at the time that it defies the attempts of historians to 
characterize the American Enlightenment as either Lockean or Scottish.”11 Himmelfarb’s 
insight, pointing to an undeniable synthesis of the competing philosophical ideas of the 
day, reveals the very uniqueness of the Founders’ contribution to American society. 
Samuel Fleischacker’s conclusion is that one of the great legacies of the Scottish 
Enlightenment “was the model of an intellectual community made up of people who could 
learn from one another, and remain friends, amid vehement disagreement.”12 
Although the most famous example of such friendships was interrupted by a decade 
of passionate political disagreement that threatened irreparable harm to their relationship, 
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson’s eventual reconciliation is documented in a fifteen-
year long exchange of letters following Jefferson’s retirement as the third president of the 
United States. In their letters, Adams and Jefferson continued to debate the philosophical 
issues that had enlightened their youth. In a letter to Adams, dated 14 October 1816, 
Jefferson wrote of Hobbes’ principle that justice is founded in contract solely: 
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I believe, on the contrary, that it is instinct and innate, that the moral sense is as 
much a part of our constitution as that of feeling, seeing, or hearing; as a wise 
creator must have seen to be necessary in an animal destined to live in society; 
that every human mind feels pleasure in doing good to another . . . .
13
 
Adams responded, “I agree perfectly with you that ‘the moral sense is as much a part of 
our condition as that of feeling,’ and in all that you say upon this subject.”14 
While it would be an overstatement to suggest that Scottish views were the 
preeminent ideological force motivating the Framers of the United States Constitution, the 
distinctively Scottish contributions to the shaping of the constitutional republic should not 
be overlooked, as they had been during most of the nineteenth century. From Francis 
Hutcheson’s moral sense to the common sense theory of Thomas Reid, the ideas of the 
Scottish Enlightenment endured in the United States, at least throughout the lifetime of the 
Founders.  
As was true of the development of competing Enlightenment ideas in Scotland, the 
private deliberations at the Constitutional Convention, the public pamphlet campaign 
waged by Federalists who supported the proposed Constitution and Anti-Federalists who 
opposed it, and the successive decisions by state ratifying conventions to adopt the 
Constitution were all characterized by vigorous debates about reason and passion, virtue 
and ambition, and authority and liberty.  Ultimately, it was this courageous spirit of 
reasoned public discourse, as much as the developing themes of liberty, which the Scottish 
Enlightenment contributed to the constitutional debates in the emerging United States. 
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